# agent-client-configs-v1

> agent-client-configs-v1: 4 Keryn rules for json (4 warning).

Source: https://keryn.dev/rules/agent-client-configs-v1/

4 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · [all packs](https://keryn.dev/rules/)

**How to read a rule**

- **Severity**: How bad the finding is if it is real: `error` fails a default gate, `warning` and `info` do not.

- **Confidence**: **P0** exploitable as written; **P1** dangerous in context; **P2** a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.

- **False-positive risk**: **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; **high**: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.

- **Edge**: The relationship the finding sits on. **reaches**: content or traffic gets to a thing; **calls**: one thing invokes another; **reads**: one thing reads from another; **writes**: one thing writes to another; **sends**: data leaves for another party; **grants**: authority is given or left unchecked; **depends_on**: something relies on a component it does not verify; **trusts**: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: **user->prompt** (untrusted input reaching a prompt); **model->code** (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); **secret->outside** (a secret leaving the trusted side); **supply-chain** (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).

- **Taxonomy chips**: References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.

## keryn.agentclient.gemini-auto-accept

`warning` json gemini-cli

Gemini CLI is configured with autoAccept, so tool calls the model proposes run without a confirmation prompt. Every file edit and command the model decides on, including ones a prompt-injected file or page talked it into, executes unattended. Keep autoAccept off and approve tool calls, or confine the agent to a sandbox and a throwaway checkout.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [grants](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#grants) authority is given or left unchecked.

[CWE-862](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-862-missing-authorization) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi02-tool-misuse-and-exploitation) [ASI09](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi09-human-agent-trust-exploitation)

**Fix:** Remove "autoAccept" (or set it to false) from \~/.gemini/settings.json and the project's .gemini/settings.json; use the per-session "always allow" prompt for the specific read-only tools you trust instead.

**References:** [https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/blob/main/docs/reference/configuration.md](https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/blob/main/docs/reference/configuration.md)

**Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule**

Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as `.gemini/settings.json` and scan it with `keryn scan .gemini --verbose`; the finding below appears.

```json
{
  "theme": "Default",
  "autoAccept": true,
  "checkpointing": { "enabled": true }
}
```

Checked with Keryn's browser engine when this page was built: it reports `keryn.agentclient.gemini-auto-accept` at line 3 (warning, proof 1). The rule's own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the [playground](https://keryn.dev/playground/) shows what does.

## keryn.agentclient.gemini-sandbox-disabled

`warning` json gemini-cli

Gemini CLI is configured with the sandbox turned off, so the commands the model runs execute directly on the host with the user's full account. Combined with any auto-approval, a single injected instruction reaches the whole machine. Run the agent in the Docker/Podman or macOS Seatbelt sandbox the CLI provides.

Confidence **P2**: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [grants](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#grants) authority is given or left unchecked.

[CWE-250](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-250-execution-with-unnecessary-privileges) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI05](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi05-unexpected-code-execution) [ASI02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi02-tool-misuse-and-exploitation)

**Fix:** Set "sandbox" to true, "docker", "podman" or "sandbox-exec" in settings.json (or pass --sandbox), and keep secrets out of the environment the sandboxed agent inherits.

**References:** [https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/blob/main/docs/reference/configuration.md](https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/blob/main/docs/reference/configuration.md) · [https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/blob/main/docs/cli/sandbox.md](https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/blob/main/docs/cli/sandbox.md)

**Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule**

Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as `.gemini/settings.json` and scan it with `keryn scan .gemini --verbose`; the finding below appears.

```json
{
  "sandbox": false,
  "theme": "Default"
}
```

Checked with Keryn's browser engine when this page was built: it reports `keryn.agentclient.gemini-sandbox-disabled` at line 2 (warning, proof 1). The rule's own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the [playground](https://keryn.dev/playground/) shows what does.

## keryn.agentclient.gemini-mcp-server-trusted

`warning` json gemini-cli, mcp

An MCP server in Gemini CLI's configuration is marked "trust": true, which skips the confirmation prompt for every tool that server exposes. Whatever the server can do (files, shell, network, the owner's accounts) the model can now do without a human seeing the call. Drop the trust flag and approve the server's tools per call, or scope the server to a narrow directory and read-only tools before trusting it.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [calls](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#calls) one thing invokes another.

[CWE-862](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-862-missing-authorization) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi02-tool-misuse-and-exploitation) [ASI04](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi04-agentic-supply-chain-vulnerabilities)

**Fix:** Remove "trust": true from the server entry; if the server must run unattended, pin its package version, restrict its arguments (paths, allowed hosts) and use "includeTools" to expose only the read-only tools.

**References:** [https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/blob/main/docs/tools/mcp-server.md](https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/blob/main/docs/tools/mcp-server.md)

**Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule**

Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as `.gemini/settings.json` and scan it with `keryn scan .gemini --verbose`; the finding below appears.

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "repo-tools": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["./tools/mcp-server.js"],
      "trust": true
    }
  }
}
```

Checked with Keryn's browser engine when this page was built: it reports `keryn.agentclient.gemini-mcp-server-trusted` at line 3 (warning, proof 1). The rule's own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the [playground](https://keryn.dev/playground/) shows what does.

## keryn.agentclient.vscode-chat-tools-auto-approve

`warning` json vscode, github-copilot

VS Code is configured to auto-approve agent tool calls (chat.tools.autoApprove), so terminal commands and file edits the model proposes run without the confirmation dialog. A prompt-injected file in the workspace then executes commands with the developer's account. Leave auto-approval off and allow specific commands through the terminal allow list instead.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [grants](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#grants) authority is given or left unchecked.

[CWE-862](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-862-missing-authorization) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi02-tool-misuse-and-exploitation) [ASI09](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi09-human-agent-trust-exploitation)

**Fix:** Remove chat.tools.autoApprove from user and workspace settings (workspace settings.json committed to a repository applies to everyone who opens it); use chat.tools.terminal.autoApprove with explicit allow and deny entries.

**References:** [https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/chat/chat-overview](https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/chat/chat-overview)

**Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule**

Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as `.vscode/settings.json` and scan it with `keryn scan .vscode --verbose`; the finding below appears.

```json
{
  "editor.formatOnSave": true,
  "chat.tools.autoApprove": true,
  "files.exclude": { "**/.git": true }
}
```

Checked with Keryn's browser engine when this page was built: it reports `keryn.agentclient.vscode-chat-tools-auto-approve` at line 3 (warning, proof 1). The rule's own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the [playground](https://keryn.dev/playground/) shows what does.
