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    agent-trust-assignment-v1

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    2 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · all packs

    How to read a rule
    Severity
    How bad the finding is if it is real: error fails a default gate, warning and info do not.
    Confidence
    P0 exploitable as written; P1 dangerous in context; P2 a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.
    False-positive risk
    low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
    Edge
    The relationship the finding sits on. reaches: content or traffic gets to a thing; calls: one thing invokes another; reads: one thing reads from another; writes: one thing writes to another; sends: data leaves for another party; grants: authority is given or left unchecked; depends_on: something relies on a component it does not verify; trusts: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: user->prompt (untrusted input reaching a prompt); model->code (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); secret->outside (a secret leaving the trusted side); supply-chain (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
    Taxonomy chips
    References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.

    keryn.trust.py.identity-assigned-from-model-output

    Section titled “keryn.trust.py.identity-assigned-from-model-output”

    error python data-flow rule python, openai, anthropic, google-genai, langchain

    A session, token, identity, privilege or trust field is assigned a value derived from model output or a tool/agent result. Model and tool output is attacker-influenced, so this lets a prompt or a poisoned tool result set the caller’s identity or privileges (confused deputy). Derive identity only from a verified principal; never from model or tool output.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).

    CWE-807 CWE-639 LLM06 ASI07 ASI03

    Fix: Set identity, session, token, privilege and trust fields only from an authenticated principal (verified session, signed token, server-side lookup). Treat model and tool output as untrusted data — never assign it to a security-relevant field.

    References: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/807.html · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule

    Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as web/session_agent.py and scan it with keryn scan web --verbose; the finding below appears.

    web/session_agent.py
    from anthropic import Anthropic
    client = Anthropic()
    def resolve_user(request, message_text: str):
    reply = client.messages.create(
    model="claude-sonnet-4-5",
    max_tokens=50,
    messages=[
    {"role": "user", "content": f"Extract the account id mentioned here: {message_text}"}
    ],
    )
    request.session.user_id = reply.content[0].text.strip()
    return request.session.user_id

    Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports keryn.trust.py.identity-assigned-from-model-output at line 14 (error, proof 2). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.

    keryn.trust.ts.identity-assigned-from-model-output

    Section titled “keryn.trust.ts.identity-assigned-from-model-output”

    error typescript, javascript data-flow rule typescript, nodejs, openai, anthropic, vercel-ai-sdk, langchain

    A session, token, identity, privilege or trust field is assigned a value derived from model output or a tool/agent result. Model and tool output is attacker-influenced, so this lets a prompt or a poisoned tool result set the caller’s identity or privileges (confused deputy). Derive identity only from a verified principal.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).

    CWE-807 CWE-639 LLM06 ASI07 ASI03

    Fix: Set identity, session, token, privilege and trust fields only from an authenticated principal; treat model and tool output as untrusted data.

    References: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/807.html · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/