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    agentic-asi-2026-v1

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    46 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · all packs

    How to read a rule
    Severity
    How bad the finding is if it is real: error fails a default gate, warning and info do not.
    Confidence
    P0 exploitable as written; P1 dangerous in context; P2 a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.
    False-positive risk
    low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
    Edge
    The relationship the finding sits on. reaches: content or traffic gets to a thing; calls: one thing invokes another; reads: one thing reads from another; writes: one thing writes to another; sends: data leaves for another party; grants: authority is given or left unchecked; depends_on: something relies on a component it does not verify; trusts: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: user->prompt (untrusted input reaching a prompt); model->code (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); secret->outside (a secret leaving the trusted side); supply-chain (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
    Taxonomy chips
    References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.

    seceng.asi06.mem0-zep-letta-write-from-untrusted-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi06.mem0-zep-letta-write-from-untrusted-python”

    warning python data-flow rule mem0, zep, letta, python

    Content from a web fetch, retriever, tool result or another agent’s output is written into long-term agent memory (Mem0 / Zep / Letta) without provenance or validation. A single poisoned page or tool response then persists and steers every later session. Validate and label the source before the write, or store it as untrusted reference material instead of memory.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: writes one thing writes to another.

    CWE-345 CWE-20 LLM08 LLM01 ASI06

    Fix: Treat tool output, retrieved documents, fetched pages and peer-agent output as untrusted. Before a memory write, run it through a validator (schema, injection classifier, size cap), attach source/provenance metadata (url, tool name, agent id, timestamp, hash), and keep it in a separate untrusted namespace that is never promoted to instructions without review.

    References: https://docs.mem0.ai/open-source/python-quickstart · https://help.getzep.com/adding-messages · https://docs.letta.com/v1-sdk/memory/archival-memory · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/ · https://pypi.org/project/zep-cloud/2.0.0/ · https://pypi.org/project/letta-client/1.12.1/

    seceng.asi06.langgraph-langchain-memory-write-from-untrusted-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi06.langgraph-langchain-memory-write-from-untrusted-python”

    error python data-flow rule langgraph, langchain, python

    Untrusted content (web fetch, retriever hit, tool result, peer-agent output) is persisted into LangGraph store/checkpoint state or LangChain chat memory without validation. Later turns read it back as trusted context, so a one-off injection becomes durable. Validate and provenance-tag before persisting.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: writes one thing writes to another.

    CWE-345 CWE-20 LLM08 LLM01 ASI06

    Fix: Do not write raw tool/retrieval/web content into store.put, graph.update_state, checkpointers or chat history. Persist a validated, size-capped summary with source metadata ({"source": ..., "trust": "untrusted"}) and render it to the model as quoted data, never as instructions.

    References: https://langchain-ai.github.io/langgraph/concepts/persistence/#memory-store · https://reference.langchain.com/python/langchain-core · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi06.memory-write-from-untrusted-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi06.memory-write-from-untrusted-ts”

    warning typescript data-flow rule mem0, zep, letta, langgraphjs, langchainjs, typescript

    Content from fetch(), a retriever, a tool result or another agent’s output is written into agent memory (mem0ai, Zep, Letta, LangGraph.js store, LangChain.js chat history) without provenance or validation. Poisoned content then persists across sessions. Validate and label the source before the write.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: writes one thing writes to another.

    CWE-345 CWE-20 LLM08 LLM01 ASI06

    Fix: Run untrusted content through a validator (schema, injection classifier, size cap) and attach source metadata before memory.add, memory.add(sessionId, ...), passages.create, store.put or addMessage; keep it in an untrusted namespace that is rendered to the model as data.

    References: https://docs.mem0.ai/open-source/node-quickstart · https://help.getzep.com/adding-messages · https://docs.letta.com/v1-sdk/memory/archival-memory · https://langchain-ai.github.io/langgraphjs/concepts/persistence/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/ · https://pypi.org/project/zep-cloud/2.0.0/

    seceng.asi06.memory-read-into-system-prompt-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi06.memory-read-into-system-prompt-python”

    error python data-flow rule mem0, langgraph, langchain, python

    Recalled long-term memory (Mem0 search, LangGraph store, LangChain memory variables) is placed in the system prompt or agent instructions. Memory is user/tool-influenced data; promoting it to system authority lets a poisoned memory override policy. Put recalled memory in a clearly delimited user/context block instead.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: writes one thing writes to another.

    CWE-345 CWE-1427 LLM01 LLM08 ASI06 ASI01

    Fix: Keep the system prompt static and reviewed. Render recalled memories as quoted reference data in a user or tool-context message (e.g. inside <memories> tags with an instruction that they are untrusted), and filter memories by owner and provenance before use.

    References: https://docs.mem0.ai/open-source/python-quickstart · https://langchain-ai.github.io/langgraph/concepts/memory/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule

    Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as assistant/chat.py and scan it with keryn scan assistant --verbose; the finding below appears.

    assistant/chat.py
    from anthropic import Anthropic
    from mem0 import Memory
    client = Anthropic()
    memory = Memory()
    def reply(user_id: str, question: str) -> str:
    hits = memory.search(question, user_id=user_id, limit=5)
    notes = "\n".join(h["memory"] for h in hits["results"])
    resp = client.messages.create(
    model="claude-sonnet-4-5",
    max_tokens=600,
    system=f"You are a helpful assistant. What you remember about this user:\n{notes}",
    messages=[{"role": "user", "content": question}],
    )
    return resp.content[0].text

    Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.asi06.memory-read-into-system-prompt-python at line 14 (error, proof 2). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.

    seceng.asi06.memory-read-into-system-prompt-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi06.memory-read-into-system-prompt-ts”

    error typescript data-flow rule mem0, langgraphjs, vercel-ai-sdk, typescript

    Recalled long-term memory (mem0ai search, LangGraph.js store) is placed in the system prompt or agent instructions. A poisoned memory then carries system authority. Render memories as delimited untrusted context in a user/context message instead.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: writes one thing writes to another.

    CWE-345 CWE-1427 LLM01 LLM08 ASI06 ASI01

    Fix: Keep system/instructions static. Pass recalled memories as quoted data in a user/context message, filtered by owner and provenance.

    References: https://docs.mem0.ai/open-source/node-quickstart · https://langchain-ai.github.io/langgraphjs/concepts/memory/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi06.memory-shared-user-scope-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi06.memory-shared-user-scope-python”

    error python mem0, zep, langgraph, python

    Agent memory is written or searched with a constant user/namespace (e.g. user_id="default", store.put(("memories",), ...)) or with no user scope at all. Every user then reads and writes the same memory, so one user can poison another’s context and recall their data. Scope memory to the authenticated principal.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-639 CWE-668 LLM08 LLM02 ASI06

    Fix: Derive user_id / the store namespace from the authenticated session (never a literal, never model output), e.g. store.put((user.id, "memories"), ...) and memory.add(msgs, user_id=current_user.id).

    References: https://docs.mem0.ai/core-concepts/memory-operations/add · https://langchain-ai.github.io/langgraph/concepts/persistence/#memory-store · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/ · https://pypi.org/project/zep-cloud/2.0.0/

    Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule

    Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as assistant/remember.py and scan it with keryn scan assistant --verbose; the finding below appears.

    assistant/remember.py
    from mem0 import Memory
    memory = Memory()
    def remember_preference(text: str) -> None:
    memory.add(
    [{"role": "user", "content": text}],
    user_id="default",
    metadata={"kind": "preference"},
    )
    def recall(query: str):
    return memory.search(query, user_id="default", limit=3)

    Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.asi06.memory-shared-user-scope-python at line 7 (error, proof 1). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.

    error typescript mem0, langgraphjs, typescript

    Agent memory is written or searched with a constant userId / namespace (mem0ai, LangGraph.js store), so all users share one memory and can poison or read each other’s context. Scope memory to the authenticated principal.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-639 CWE-668 LLM08 LLM02 ASI06

    Fix: Pass userId from the verified session (session.user.id), never a literal; namespace stores as [userId, "memories"].

    References: https://docs.mem0.ai/open-source/node-quickstart · https://langchain-ai.github.io/langgraphjs/concepts/persistence/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi06.vector-upsert-untrusted-without-source-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi06.vector-upsert-untrusted-without-source-python”

    warning python data-flow rule langchain, chromadb, python

    Fetched or tool-produced content is upserted into a vector store without any metadata, so retrieval cannot tell attacker-supplied chunks from curated ones. Poisoned chunks then resurface as trusted context. Attach source/trust metadata on every write and filter on it at query time.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).

    CWE-345 LLM08 LLM04 ASI06

    Fix: Pass metadatas=[&#123;"source": url, "trust": "untrusted", "ingested_by": tool_name&#125;] (or Document metadata) on every upsert of external content, and filter retrieval on trust/source.

    References: https://reference.langchain.com/python/langchain-core · https://docs.trychroma.com/docs/collections/add-data · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi06.vector-upsert-untrusted-without-source-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi06.vector-upsert-untrusted-without-source-ts”

    warning typescript data-flow rule langchainjs, chromadb, typescript

    Fetched or tool-produced content is written to a vector store (Chroma JS / LangChain.js Document) without metadata, so retrieval cannot distinguish attacker-supplied chunks. Attach source/trust metadata on every write and filter on it at query time.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).

    CWE-345 LLM08 LLM04 ASI06

    Fix: Include metadata: &#123; source, trust: "untrusted" &#125; on each Document / metadatas on each Chroma add, and filter retrieval on it.

    References: https://docs.langchain.com/oss/javascript/langchain/overview · https://docs.trychroma.com/docs/collections/add-data · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi01.system-prompt-from-retrieved-or-tool-content-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi01.system-prompt-from-retrieved-or-tool-content-python”

    error python data-flow rule langchain, openai, anthropic, python

    A retrieved document or tool result is concatenated into the system prompt. Text the agent merely read now carries system authority and can rewrite the agent’s goal. Pass retrieved/tool content as delimited data in a user or tool message, never in the system role.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).

    CWE-1427 CWE-345 LLM01 ASI01

    Fix: Keep the system role static. Put retrieved chunks and tool results in user/tool messages wrapped in explicit delimiters with an instruction that they are data, and run an injection filter on them.

    References: https://docs.langchain.com/oss/python/langchain/overview · https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/build-with-claude/prompt-engineering/claude-prompting-best-practices#give-claude-a-role · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule

    Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as rag/answer.py and scan it with keryn scan rag --verbose; the finding below appears.

    rag/answer.py
    from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage, SystemMessage
    def answer(llm, vectorstore, question: str) -> str:
    docs = vectorstore.similarity_search(question, k=4)
    context = "\n\n".join(d.page_content for d in docs)
    messages = [
    SystemMessage(content=f"Follow the guidance below when answering.\n{context}"),
    HumanMessage(content=question),
    ]
    return llm.invoke(messages).content

    Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.asi01.system-prompt-from-retrieved-or-tool-content-python at line 8 (error, proof 2). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.

    seceng.asi01.system-prompt-from-retrieved-or-tool-content-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi01.system-prompt-from-retrieved-or-tool-content-ts”

    error typescript data-flow rule langchainjs, vercel-ai-sdk, typescript

    A retrieved document or tool result flows into the system prompt (role: "system", system:, SystemMessage). Text the agent read now carries system authority and can hijack its goal. Pass it as delimited data in a user/tool message.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).

    CWE-1427 CWE-345 LLM01 ASI01

    Fix: Keep system static; put retrieved/tool content in user or tool messages with delimiters and an injection filter.

    References: https://ai-sdk.dev/docs/foundations/prompts · https://docs.langchain.com/oss/javascript/langchain/overview · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi01.agent-instructions-loaded-at-runtime-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi01.agent-instructions-loaded-at-runtime-python”

    error python data-flow rule openai-agents, crewai, autogen, langgraph, claude-agent-sdk, python

    An agent’s instructions / system prompt / goal are loaded at runtime from a URL or database row and passed straight into the agent constructor. Whoever can edit that row or host can silently re-task the agent. Pin the instructions in code or verify a signature/hash before use.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: depends_on something relies on a component it does not verify; it crosses the supply-chain boundary (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).

    CWE-494 CWE-345 LLM01 LLM03 ASI01

    Fix: Ship instructions with the code (versioned, reviewed). If they must be dynamic, store them with a content hash/signature and an approval record, and verify (verify_signature(...)) before constructing the agent.

    References: https://openai.github.io/openai-agents-python/agents/ · https://docs.crewai.com/en/concepts/agents · https://microsoft.github.io/autogen/stable/reference/python/autogen_agentchat.agents.html · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule

    Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as crew/support_agent.py and scan it with keryn scan crew --verbose; the finding below appears.

    crew/support_agent.py
    import httpx
    from agents import Agent
    PROMPT_URL = "https://config.example.com/prompts/support-agent.txt"
    def load_support_agent() -> Agent:
    resp = httpx.get(PROMPT_URL, timeout=5)
    resp.raise_for_status()
    return Agent(
    name="support",
    model="gpt-4.1-mini",
    instructions=resp.text,
    )

    Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.asi01.agent-instructions-loaded-at-runtime-python at line 13 (error, proof 2). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.

    seceng.asi01.agent-instructions-loaded-at-runtime-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi01.agent-instructions-loaded-at-runtime-ts”

    error typescript data-flow rule openai-agents, mastra, langgraphjs, vercel-ai-sdk, typescript

    An agent’s instructions / system prompt are loaded at runtime from a URL or database row and passed into the agent constructor. Whoever controls that source can re-task the agent. Pin instructions in code or verify a signature before use.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: depends_on something relies on a component it does not verify; it crosses the supply-chain boundary (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).

    CWE-494 CWE-345 LLM01 LLM03 ASI01

    Fix: Keep instructions in reviewed source. For dynamic instructions require a stored hash/signature and verify it before constructing the agent.

    References: https://openai.github.io/openai-agents-js/guides/agents/ · https://mastra.ai/docs/agents/overview · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi03.tool-uses-static-privileged-credential-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi03.tool-uses-static-privileged-credential-python”

    warning python langchain, openai-agents, mcp, supabase, boto3, python

    An agent tool performs actions with a static privileged credential (Supabase service_role key, admin/root token, long-lived AWS keys) instead of the calling user’s delegated token. Any user who can steer the agent inherits that privilege. Use the caller’s token (RLS) or short-lived, down-scoped credentials.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-250 CWE-269 LLM06 ASI03

    Fix: Pass the end user’s access token into the tool context and build the client with it (Supabase anon key + user JWT so RLS applies), or mint per-request STS credentials with a session policy scoped to that user.

    References: https://supabase.com/docs/guides/getting-started/api-keys · https://docs.aws.amazon.com/boto3/latest/reference/services/sts/client/assume_role.html · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi03.tool-uses-static-privileged-credential-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi03.tool-uses-static-privileged-credential-ts”

    error typescript vercel-ai-sdk, langchainjs, mcp, supabase, aws-sdk, typescript

    An agent tool (AI SDK tool(), LangChain.js tool, MCP server.tool) uses a static privileged credential (service_role / admin / root key, static AWS keys) rather than the caller’s delegated token. Steering the agent grants that privilege. Use the user’s token or short-lived scoped credentials.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-250 CWE-269 LLM06 ASI03

    Fix: Forward the user’s JWT into the tool (e.g. via experimental_context) and create the client with it, or use STS AssumeRole with a per-user session policy.

    References: https://supabase.com/docs/guides/getting-started/api-keys · https://ai-sdk.dev/docs/ai-sdk-core/tools-and-tool-calling · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi03.tool-authz-from-model-argument-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi03.tool-authz-from-model-argument-python”

    error python langchain, openai-agents, mcp, python

    A tool makes an authorization decision from a model-supplied argument (role, is_admin, user_id, tenant_id). The model fills these from conversation text, so a prompt injection can claim admin or another tenant. Take identity and role from the authenticated request context, never from tool arguments.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-639 CWE-863 LLM06 ASI03

    Fix: Remove identity/role parameters from the tool schema. Inject them from the server side (LangChain InjectedToolArg, OpenAI Agents RunContextWrapper, MCP auth context) and authorize against those.

    References: https://docs.langchain.com/oss/python/langchain/overview · https://openai.github.io/openai-agents-python/context/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule

    Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as support/tools.py and scan it with keryn scan support --verbose; the finding below appears.

    support/tools.py
    from agents import function_tool
    from support.store import orders
    @function_tool
    def cancel_order(order_id: str, role: str) -> str:
    """Cancel an order. Staff can cancel any order."""
    if role == "staff":
    orders.cancel(order_id)
    return f"Order {order_id} cancelled"
    return "Only staff can cancel orders"

    Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.asi03.tool-authz-from-model-argument-python at line 9 (error, proof 1). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.

    seceng.asi03.tool-authz-from-model-argument-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi03.tool-authz-from-model-argument-ts”

    warning typescript vercel-ai-sdk, langchainjs, typescript

    A tool’s execute handler authorizes on a model-supplied argument (role, isAdmin, userId, tenantId). A prompt injection can set these freely. Take identity and role from the authenticated server-side context.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-639 CWE-863 LLM06 ASI03

    Fix: Drop identity/role fields from the tool’s input schema; read them from the session passed via tool context and authorize against that.

    References: https://ai-sdk.dev/docs/ai-sdk-core/tools-and-tool-calling · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi03.impersonation-header-from-model-output-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi03.impersonation-header-from-model-output-python”

    error python data-flow rule openai, anthropic, langchain, python

    An impersonation / delegation header (X-User-Id, Act-As, X-On-Behalf-Of, …) is set from model-controlled tool arguments. The downstream service trusts that header for identity, so the model (and anyone who can inject into it) chooses who the agent acts as. Set it from the authenticated session.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

    Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).

    CWE-290 CWE-639 LLM06 ASI03

    Fix: Derive the acting principal from the verified request (session/JWT) and pass a token exchanged for that user (OAuth token exchange, RFC 8693) instead of a free-form header.

    References: https://developers.openai.com/api/docs/guides/function-calling · https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/agents-and-tools/tool-use/overview · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule

    Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as mcp_server/tickets.py and scan it with keryn scan mcp_server --verbose; the finding below appears.

    mcp_server/tickets.py
    import httpx
    from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
    mcp = FastMCP("tickets")
    API = "https://tickets.internal.example/api"
    @mcp.tool()
    def list_tickets(requester: str, status: str = "open") -> list:
    """List tickets raised by a user."""
    resp = httpx.get(
    f"{API}/tickets",
    params={"status": status},
    headers={"X-User-Id": requester, "Accept": "application/json"},
    timeout=10,
    )
    resp.raise_for_status()
    return resp.json()

    Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.asi03.impersonation-header-from-model-output-python at line 14 (error, proof 2). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.

    seceng.asi03.impersonation-header-from-model-output-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi03.impersonation-header-from-model-output-ts”

    error typescript data-flow rule openai, anthropic, vercel-ai-sdk, typescript

    An impersonation / delegation header (X-User-Id, Act-As, X-On-Behalf-Of, …) is set from model-controlled tool-call arguments, letting the model pick whose identity the agent uses downstream. Set it from the authenticated session.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

    Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).

    CWE-290 CWE-639 LLM06 ASI03

    Fix: Use the session’s user and an exchanged, user-bound token for downstream calls, never a header value taken from tool arguments.

    References: https://developers.openai.com/api/docs/guides/function-calling · https://ai-sdk.dev/docs/ai-sdk-core/tools-and-tool-calling · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi03.agent-sandbox-runs-as-root-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi03.agent-sandbox-runs-as-root-python”

    error python docker, e2b, langchain, python

    The agent’s execution sandbox runs as root or the agent’s tools escalate with sudo. Any tool misuse or code-execution bug then has full privileges inside (and often outside) the sandbox. Run as an unprivileged user and drop sudo.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-250 LLM06 ASI03 ASI05

    Fix: Set user="1000:1000" (or a named unprivileged user), drop capabilities (cap_drop=["ALL"]), and remove sudo from tool commands; if a privileged step is needed, perform it outside the agent with approval.

    References: https://docker-py.readthedocs.io/en/stable/containers.html · https://docs.e2b.dev/commands · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi03.agent-sandbox-runs-as-root-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi03.agent-sandbox-runs-as-root-ts”

    error typescript dockerode, e2b, typescript

    The agent’s execution sandbox runs as root (dockerode User: "root") or its tools escalate with sudo. A tool-misuse or code-execution bug then has full privileges. Run as an unprivileged user and drop sudo.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-250 LLM06 ASI03 ASI05

    Fix: Create containers with User: "1000:1000" and CapDrop: ["ALL"]; remove sudo from agent commands.

    References: https://github.com/apocas/dockerode · https://docs.docker.com/reference/api/engine/version/v1.47/#tag/Container/operation/ContainerCreate · https://docs.e2b.dev/commands · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi07.a2a-agent-card-without-security-schemes-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi07.a2a-agent-card-without-security-schemes-python”

    warning python a2a, python

    An A2A AgentCard is published without security_schemes / security (or with them empty). Peer agents and clients get no declared authentication requirement, so the agent’s JSON-RPC endpoint is effectively open to any caller that can reach it. Declare an auth scheme and enforce it on the endpoint.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: trusts one party believes another without evidence.

    CWE-306 LLM06 ASI07

    Fix: Set security_schemes=&#123;"bearer": SecurityScheme(...)&#125; and security=[&#123;"bearer": []&#125;] on the AgentCard (OAuth2/OIDC or mTLS preferred), and validate the credential in middleware before the request handler.

    References: https://a2a-protocol.org/latest/specification/ · https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-python · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/ · https://pypi.org/project/a2a-sdk/0.3.25/

    seceng.asi07.a2a-agent-card-without-security-schemes-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi07.a2a-agent-card-without-security-schemes-ts”

    warning typescript a2a, a2a-js, typescript

    An A2A AgentCard is defined without securitySchemes (or with an empty one / authentication: null). The agent advertises no authentication, so its JSON-RPC endpoint is effectively open to any peer. Declare and enforce an auth scheme.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: trusts one party believes another without evidence.

    CWE-306 LLM06 ASI07

    Fix: Add securitySchemes and security to the card and validate the credential in Express middleware before A2AExpressApp routes.

    References: https://a2a-protocol.org/latest/specification/ · https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-js · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi07.a2a-push-notification-url-not-allowlisted-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi07.a2a-push-notification-url-not-allowlisted-python”

    error python data-flow rule a2a, httpx, python

    The A2A push-notification URL supplied by the client is used directly as the target of an outbound request. Any caller can make the agent POST task data to internal services or attacker hosts (SSRF and data exfiltration). Validate the URL against an allow-list and verify ownership before sending.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-918 LLM06 LLM02 ASI07

    Fix: Check the push URL with an allow-list (scheme https, approved hosts, no private/link-local IPs) and perform the A2A ownership challenge before storing or posting to it.

    References: https://a2a-protocol.org/latest/specification/#95-push-notification-setup-and-usage · https://a2a-protocol.org/latest/topics/streaming-and-async/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi07.a2a-push-notification-url-not-allowlisted-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi07.a2a-push-notification-url-not-allowlisted-ts”

    error typescript data-flow rule a2a, a2a-js, typescript

    The A2A push-notification URL from the request is fetched/posted without an allow-list, letting any client aim the agent’s outbound task updates at internal or attacker hosts. Validate the URL and verify ownership first.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-918 LLM06 LLM02 ASI07

    Fix: Allow-list push hosts (https only, deny private ranges) and complete the A2A validation-token handshake before sending notifications.

    References: https://a2a-protocol.org/latest/specification/#95-push-notification-setup-and-usage · https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-js · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi07.a2a-jsonrpc-endpoint-without-auth-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi07.a2a-jsonrpc-endpoint-without-auth-python”

    warning python a2a, starlette, fastapi, python

    An A2A Starlette/FastAPI application is built without authentication middleware. The JSON-RPC endpoint accepts message/send and task calls from any peer, so an unauthenticated agent or attacker can drive this agent. Add auth middleware (or pass middleware=[...] to build()).

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: trusts one party believes another without evidence.

    CWE-306 LLM06 ASI07

    Fix: Build with server.build(middleware=[Middleware(AuthenticationMiddleware, backend=...)]) or call app.add_middleware(...) on the built app, and reject requests lacking the scheme declared in the card.

    References: https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-python · https://a2a-protocol.org/latest/topics/enterprise-ready/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi07.a2a-jsonrpc-endpoint-without-auth-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi07.a2a-jsonrpc-endpoint-without-auth-ts”

    warning typescript a2a, a2a-js, express, typescript

    A2AExpressApp.setupRoutes mounts the A2A JSON-RPC endpoint on an Express app with no auth middleware registered before it and none passed to setupRoutes. Any peer can call the agent. Register authentication middleware first.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: trusts one party believes another without evidence.

    CWE-306 LLM06 ASI07

    Fix: app.use(authMiddleware) before setupRoutes(app) (or pass middlewares to setupRoutes) and verify the credential declared in the AgentCard.

    References: https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-js · https://a2a-protocol.org/latest/topics/enterprise-ready/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi07.peer-agent-message-as-instructions-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi07.peer-agent-message-as-instructions-python”

    error python data-flow rule a2a, autogen, openai-agents, crewai, python

    Output or messages from another agent (A2A request input, AutoGen last_message / chat summary, an OpenAI Agents final_output, a CrewAI kickoff result) are promoted to this agent’s system message or instructions. A compromised or spoofed peer can then re-task this agent. Treat peer messages as untrusted data in the user role, behind a trust boundary.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: trusts one party believes another without evidence.

    CWE-1427 CWE-345 LLM01 LLM06 ASI07 ASI01

    Fix: Pass peer-agent output as a user/tool message with explicit delimiters, validate it against a schema, and authenticate the peer (signed A2A messages / mTLS). Never call update_system_message or set instructions from a peer’s text.

    References: https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-python · https://microsoft.github.io/autogen/0.2/docs/reference/agentchat/conversable_agent/ · https://openai.github.io/openai-agents-python/results/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule

    Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as orchestrator/handoff.py and scan it with keryn scan orchestrator --verbose; the finding below appears.

    orchestrator/handoff.py
    from autogen import AssistantAgent
    def build_executor(llm_config, planner_chat):
    plan = planner_chat.summary
    return AssistantAgent(
    name="executor",
    llm_config=llm_config,
    system_message=f"You carry out the plan below step by step.\n{plan}",
    )

    Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.asi07.peer-agent-message-as-instructions-python at line 9 (error, proof 2). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.

    seceng.asi07.peer-agent-message-as-instructions-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi07.peer-agent-message-as-instructions-ts”

    error typescript data-flow rule a2a-js, openai-agents, vercel-ai-sdk, typescript

    A message or result from another agent (A2A requestContext.userMessage, OpenAI Agents finalOutput) is promoted to this agent’s system prompt or instructions. A compromised peer can re-task this agent. Treat peer output as untrusted data in the user role.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: trusts one party believes another without evidence.

    CWE-1427 CWE-345 LLM01 LLM06 ASI07 ASI01

    Fix: Deliver peer output as a delimited user message validated against a schema; authenticate the peer.

    References: https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-js · https://openai.github.io/openai-agents-js/guides/results/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/ · https://www.npmjs.com/package/@a2a-js/sdk/v/1.3.0

    seceng.asi07.agent-event-stream-dispatches-commands-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi07.agent-event-stream-dispatches-commands-ts”

    error typescript data-flow rule ag-ui, sse, websocket, typescript

    Data from an agent event stream (SSE/WebSocket event.data, AG-UI tool-call events) selects which function runs or is executed as code/shell. Events from a remote agent are untrusted; treating them as commands lets a compromised or spoofed agent invoke arbitrary local actions. Dispatch only through a fixed allow-list map after authenticating the stream.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).

    CWE-94 CWE-470 LLM05 LLM06 ASI07

    Fix: Authenticate the event source, validate event payloads with a schema, and look the action up in a Map of approved handlers (if (!HANDLERS.has(name)) return), never obj[name](...), eval, or exec.

    References: https://docs.ag-ui.com/concepts/events · https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/EventSource · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi09.approval-gate-disabled-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi09.approval-gate-disabled-python”

    error python claude-agent-sdk, openai-agents, langgraph, agno, python

    Human approval for agent actions is explicitly switched off (auto_approve=True, permission_mode="bypassPermissions", require_approval="never", interrupt_before=[], --dangerously-skip-permissions / --yolo, …). Every tool call, including destructive ones, now runs on the model’s say-so. Keep approval on for side-effecting tools.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-862 LLM06 ASI09 ASI02

    Fix: Use permission_mode="default" with a can_use_tool policy, require_approval=&#123;"always": &#123;...&#125;&#125; for write tools, and interrupt_before=["tools"] (or interrupt() in the tool) for destructive actions. Restrict bypass modes to throwaway sandboxes with no credentials.

    References: https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/agent-sdk/permissions · https://openai.github.io/openai-agents-python/mcp/ · https://langchain-ai.github.io/langgraph/concepts/human_in_the_loop/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/ · https://raw.githubusercontent.com/openai/codex/main/codex-rs/protocol/src/protocol.rs · https://raw.githubusercontent.com/openai/codex/main/codex-rs/utils/cli/src/shared_options.rs · https://raw.githubusercontent.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/main/docs/cli/cli-reference.md

    Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule

    Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as agent/mcp_setup.py and scan it with keryn scan agent --verbose; the finding below appears.

    agent/mcp_setup.py
    from openai import OpenAI
    client = OpenAI()
    def run(task: str):
    return client.responses.create(
    model="gpt-4.1",
    input=task,
    tools=[
    {
    "type": "mcp",
    "server_label": "deploy",
    "server_url": "https://mcp.example.com/sse",
    "require_approval": "never",
    }
    ],
    )

    Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.asi09.approval-gate-disabled-python at line 11 (error, proof 1). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.

    error typescript claude-agent-sdk, openai-agents, vercel-ai-sdk, langgraphjs, typescript

    Human approval for agent actions is explicitly switched off (permissionMode: "bypassPermissions", dangerouslySkipPermissions, requireApproval: "never", needsApproval: false, interruptBefore: [], --yolo, …). Destructive tool calls run without a human check. Keep approval on for side effects.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-862 LLM06 ASI09 ASI02

    Fix: Use permissionMode: "default" with a canUseTool policy, needsApproval: true / requireApproval: "always" for write tools, and interruptBefore: ["tools"] for destructive graphs.

    References: https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/agent-sdk/permissions · https://openai.github.io/openai-agents-js/guides/human-in-the-loop/ · https://ai-sdk.dev/docs/ai-sdk-core/tools-and-tool-calling · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/ · https://code.claude.com/docs/en/agent-sdk/typescript · https://raw.githubusercontent.com/openai/codex/main/codex-rs/protocol/src/protocol.rs · https://raw.githubusercontent.com/openai/codex/main/codex-rs/utils/cli/src/shared_options.rs · https://raw.githubusercontent.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/main/docs/cli/cli-reference.md

    seceng.asi09.approval-callback-always-allows-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi09.approval-callback-always-allows-python”

    error python claude-agent-sdk, openai-agents, python

    An approval / permission callback (can_use_tool, on_approval_request, approve_*, confirm_*) unconditionally allows. The UI or SDK shows a human-in-the-loop control that never actually blocks, which is worse than none because operators trust it. Implement a real policy or ask the human.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-862 LLM06 ASI09

    Fix: Evaluate the tool name and input against an allow/deny policy and route anything side-effecting to an interactive human prompt; return PermissionResultDeny / &#123;"approve": False&#125; by default.

    References: https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/agent-sdk/permissions · https://openai.github.io/openai-agents-python/ref/tool/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/ · https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anthropics/claude-agent-sdk-python/main/src/claude_agent_sdk/types.py

    seceng.asi09.approval-callback-always-allows-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi09.approval-callback-always-allows-ts”

    error typescript claude-agent-sdk, openai-agents, vercel-ai-sdk, typescript

    An approval / permission callback (canUseTool, onApproval, approve*) unconditionally allows, so the human-in-the-loop control never blocks anything. Implement a real policy or ask the human.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-862 LLM06 ASI09

    Fix: Check tool name and input against policy; default to &#123; behavior: "deny" &#125; and prompt the user for side-effecting tools.

    References: https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/agent-sdk/permissions · https://openai.github.io/openai-agents-js/guides/human-in-the-loop/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi10.agent-sandbox-host-escape-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi10.agent-sandbox-host-escape-python”

    error python docker, python

    An agent/tool container is started with host networking, host PID/IPC namespace, privileged mode, the Docker socket or the host root filesystem. A rogue or hijacked agent can then reach internal services or take over the host. Use an isolated network, unprivileged container, and no host mounts.

    Confidence P0: exploitable as written. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-250 CWE-668 LLM06 ASI10 ASI05

    Fix: Run agent sandboxes with network_mode="none" (or a dedicated egress-filtered network), privileged=False, cap_drop=["ALL"], read-only rootfs and only a scratch volume; never mount /var/run/docker.sock or /.

    References: https://docker-py.readthedocs.io/en/stable/containers.html · https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule

    Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as sandbox/runner.py and scan it with keryn scan sandbox --verbose; the finding below appears.

    sandbox/runner.py
    import docker
    client = docker.from_env()
    def run_generated_script(path: str) -> str:
    container = client.containers.run(
    "python:3.12-slim",
    ["python", "/work/script.py"],
    volumes={path: {"bind": "/work/script.py", "mode": "ro"}},
    network_mode="host",
    mem_limit="256m",
    remove=True,
    )
    return container.decode()

    Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.asi10.agent-sandbox-host-escape-python at line 7 (error, proof 1). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.

    error typescript dockerode, docker, typescript

    An agent/tool container (dockerode or docker CLI argv) is started with host networking, host PID, privileged mode, the Docker socket or the host root bind-mounted. A rogue agent can reach internal services or take over the host. Isolate the network and drop privileges.

    Confidence P0: exploitable as written. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-250 CWE-668 LLM06 ASI10 ASI05

    Fix: Use HostConfig: &#123; NetworkMode: "none", Privileged: false, CapDrop: ["ALL"], ReadonlyRootfs: true &#125; with only a scratch bind; never bind the Docker socket or /.

    References: https://github.com/apocas/dockerode · https://docs.docker.com/reference/api/engine/version/v1.47/#tag/Container/operation/ContainerCreate · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi10.code-sandbox-unrestricted-lifetime-or-network-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi10.code-sandbox-unrestricted-lifetime-or-network-python”

    warning python e2b, modal, daytona, python

    An agent code sandbox (E2B, Modal, Daytona) is created with open internet egress and no explicit timeout, or with auto-stop disabled. A hijacked agent gets an unbounded, internet-connected runtime to exfiltrate data or persist. Set a timeout and restrict egress.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-400 CWE-668 LLM10 LLM06 ASI10

    Fix: Pass timeout= and allow_internet_access=False (E2B), timeout= and block_network=True / cidr_allowlist= (Modal), and a non-zero auto_stop_interval plus network_block_all=True (Daytona).

    References: https://docs.e2b.dev/sandbox · https://modal.com/docs/guide/sandboxes · https://www.daytona.io/docs/sandboxes · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/ · https://pypi.org/project/e2b/2.59.0/ · https://pypi.org/project/modal/1.6.2/ · https://pypi.org/project/daytona/0.226.1/

    seceng.asi10.code-sandbox-unrestricted-lifetime-or-network-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi10.code-sandbox-unrestricted-lifetime-or-network-ts”

    warning typescript e2b, daytona, typescript

    An agent code sandbox (E2B, Daytona) is created without a timeout and with internet access, or with auto-stop disabled. A hijacked agent gets an unbounded, internet-connected runtime. Set timeoutMs and restrict egress.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-400 CWE-668 LLM10 LLM06 ASI10

    Fix: Sandbox.create(&#123; timeoutMs, allowInternetAccess: false &#125;) for E2B; non-zero autoStopInterval and networkBlockAll: true for Daytona.

    References: https://docs.e2b.dev/sandbox · https://www.daytona.io/docs/sandboxes · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/ · https://www.npmjs.com/package/e2b

    seceng.asi10.scheduled-agent-without-budget-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi10.scheduled-agent-without-budget-python”

    warning python celery, apscheduler, modal, openai-agents, langgraph, crewai, python

    A scheduled / background job (Celery, APScheduler, Modal cron) runs an agent with no turn, recursion, time or cost bound on the call. Nobody is watching when it runs, so a hijacked or looping agent keeps acting with its write tools. Bound every unattended run and add a kill switch.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-400 CWE-770 LLM10 LLM06 ASI10 ASI08

    Fix: Pass max_turns= (OpenAI Agents), config=&#123;"recursion_limit": N&#125; (LangGraph), max_iter/max_rpm (CrewAI), wrap in asyncio.wait_for(..., timeout), enforce a per-run cost budget and check a global kill-switch flag before each run.

    References: https://docs.celeryq.dev/en/stable/userguide/periodic-tasks.html · https://modal.com/docs/guide/cron · https://openai.github.io/openai-agents-python/running_agents/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/ · https://pypi.org/project/modal/1.6.2/

    seceng.asi10.scheduled-agent-without-budget-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi10.scheduled-agent-without-budget-ts”

    warning typescript node-cron, trigger-dev, openai-agents, vercel-ai-sdk, typescript

    A cron / scheduled job (node-cron, cron, Trigger.dev schedules) runs an agent with no step, turn, time or cost bound on the call. Unattended runs keep acting with write tools if hijacked or looping. Bound every unattended run and add a kill switch.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-400 CWE-770 LLM10 LLM06 ASI10 ASI08

    Fix: Pass maxTurns / stopWhen: stepCountIs(n) / recursionLimit, an AbortSignal.timeout(ms), a cost budget, and check a kill-switch flag at the start of each scheduled run.

    References: https://github.com/node-cron/node-cron · https://trigger.dev/docs/tasks/scheduled · https://openai.github.io/openai-agents-js/guides/running-agents/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/ · https://www.npmjs.com/package/@trigger.dev/sdk

    seceng.asi08.unbounded-agent-fanout-from-model-output-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi08.unbounded-agent-fanout-from-model-output-python”

    error python data-flow rule asyncio, openai-agents, langchain, python

    A list produced by the model (structured output, final_output, parsed JSON) drives an asyncio.gather / pool fan-out of agent runs with no cap. A manipulated or runaway plan can spawn hundreds of sub-agents, cascading cost, rate-limit and side-effect failures. Cap the list and bound concurrency.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).

    CWE-770 CWE-400 LLM10 LLM06 ASI08

    Fix: Truncate model-produced work lists (items[:MAX_SUBTASKS]), validate them against a schema with a max length, run sub-agents under an asyncio.Semaphore, and trip a circuit breaker on repeated failures.

    References: https://docs.python.org/3/library/asyncio-task.html#asyncio.gather · https://openai.github.io/openai-agents-python/multi_agent/ · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule

    Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as research/fanout.py and scan it with keryn scan research --verbose; the finding below appears.

    research/fanout.py
    import asyncio
    from agents import Agent, Runner
    planner = Agent(name="planner", instructions="List the sub-questions to research, one per line.")
    worker = Agent(name="worker", instructions="Research the sub-question and summarise.")
    async def research(topic: str):
    plan = await Runner.run(planner, topic)
    subtasks = plan.final_output.splitlines()
    results = await asyncio.gather(*[Runner.run(worker, q) for q in subtasks])
    return [r.final_output for r in results]

    Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.asi08.unbounded-agent-fanout-from-model-output-python at line 12 (error, proof 2). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.

    seceng.asi08.unbounded-agent-fanout-from-model-output-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi08.unbounded-agent-fanout-from-model-output-ts”

    error typescript data-flow rule vercel-ai-sdk, openai, openai-agents, typescript

    A list produced by the model (generateObject output, parsed completion, finalOutput) drives a Promise.all(items.map(...)) fan-out with no cap. A manipulated plan can spawn unbounded sub-agent runs and cascade failures. Cap the list and bound concurrency.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).

    CWE-770 CWE-400 LLM10 LLM06 ASI08

    Fix: Constrain the schema (z.array(...).max(N)), slice the list, and run sub-agents through p-limit / p-map(&#123; concurrency &#125;) with a circuit breaker.

    References: https://ai-sdk.dev/docs/ai-sdk-core/generating-structured-data · https://github.com/sindresorhus/p-limit · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi08.agent-retry-without-cap-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi08.agent-retry-without-cap-python”

    error python tenacity, backoff, python

    An agent run is wrapped in a tenacity @retry / backoff decorator with no stop condition. A failing downstream (rate limit, poisoned input, broken tool) is retried forever, multiplying cost and side effects and cascading load to every dependent service. Add a stop and capped exponential backoff.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-400 CWE-834 LLM10 ASI08

    Fix: Use @retry(stop=stop_after_attempt(3), wait=wait_exponential(max=30)) (or max_tries/max_time with backoff), retry only idempotent steps, and open a circuit breaker after repeated failures.

    References: https://tenacity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/ · https://github.com/litl/backoff · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    error typescript p-retry, async-retry, typescript

    An agent run is retried with an infinite policy (retries: Infinity, forever: true). A failing downstream is hammered indefinitely and every retry may repeat side effects. Cap attempts and back off.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    CWE-400 CWE-834 LLM10 ASI08

    Fix: Use a finite retries with factor/maxTimeout, retry only idempotent steps, and add a circuit breaker.

    References: https://github.com/sindresorhus/p-retry · https://github.com/vercel/async-retry · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi08.tool-error-swallowed-as-success-python

    Section titled “seceng.asi08.tool-error-swallowed-as-success-python”

    error python langchain, openai-agents, mcp, python

    A tool catches an exception and reports success ("ok", &#123;"success": True&#125;, "done"). The model and any downstream agents then build on an action that never happened, propagating a silent failure through the workflow. Return the error (or raise) so the agent and orchestrator can react.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

    Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another.

    CWE-390 CWE-755 LLM06 LLM09 ASI08

    Fix: In the except branch return an explicit error result (MCP isError: true, LangChain ToolException, &#123;"success": False, "error": ...&#125;) or re-raise; never a success string.

    References: https://docs.langchain.com/oss/python/langchain/overview · https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/server/tools#error-handling · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/

    seceng.asi08.tool-error-swallowed-as-success-ts

    Section titled “seceng.asi08.tool-error-swallowed-as-success-ts”

    error typescript vercel-ai-sdk, langchainjs, mcp, typescript

    A tool’s execute handler catches an error and reports success, so the model and downstream agents act on a step that never happened. Return an error result (isError: true) or rethrow.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

    Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another.

    CWE-390 CWE-755 LLM06 LLM09 ASI08

    Fix: Return &#123; isError: true, content: [...] &#125; (MCP) or &#123; success: false, error &#125;, or rethrow so the SDK surfaces the failure to the model.

    References: https://ai-sdk.dev/docs/ai-sdk-core/tools-and-tool-calling · https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/server/tools#error-handling · https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/