browser-extension-bundled-artifacts-v2
7 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · all packs
How to read a rule
- Severity
- How bad the finding is if it is real:
errorfails a default gate,warningandinfodo not. - Confidence
- P0 exploitable as written; P1 dangerous in context; P2 a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.
- False-positive risk
- low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
- Edge
- The relationship the finding sits on. reaches: content or traffic gets to a thing; calls: one thing invokes another; reads: one thing reads from another; writes: one thing writes to another; sends: data leaves for another party; grants: authority is given or left unchecked; depends_on: something relies on a component it does not verify; trusts: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: user->prompt (untrusted input reaching a prompt); model->code (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); secret->outside (a secret leaving the trusted side); supply-chain (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
- Taxonomy chips
- References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.
seceng.bundle.ai-provider-endpoint-in-built-artifact
Section titled “seceng.bundle.ai-provider-endpoint-in-built-artifact”info javascript, typescript browser-extension
Built/minified browser artifact contains AI provider endpoint. Review whether page data, prompts, or provider keys are exposed client-side.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: sends data leaves for another party; it crosses the secret->outside boundary (a secret leaving the trusted side).
seceng.bundle-hardcoded-ai-key
Section titled “seceng.bundle-hardcoded-ai-key”warning javascript, typescript browser-extension
Built/minified artifact appears to contain hardcoded AI provider token or key.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: reads one thing reads from another.
seceng.bundle-embedded-system-prompt
Section titled “seceng.bundle-embedded-system-prompt”warning javascript, typescript browser-extension
Built artifact contains likely system/developer prompt text. Client-visible prompts can be extracted and manipulated.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).
seceng.bundle-tool-schema-exposed
Section titled “seceng.bundle-tool-schema-exposed”warning javascript, typescript browser-extension
Built artifact contains tool/function schema definitions. Client-exposed tool schemas can aid tool injection and prompt extraction attacks.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: reads one thing reads from another.
CWE-200 LLM06 LLM07 ASI01 ASI02
seceng.bundle-source-map-with-ai-secrets-risk
Section titled “seceng.bundle-source-map-with-ai-secrets-risk”info javascript, typescript browser-extension
Source map or sourceMappingURL is present near AI endpoints or prompt/tool strings. Source maps may expose prompts, tokens, and internal logic.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: sends data leaves for another party; it crosses the secret->outside boundary (a secret leaving the trusted side).
CWE-200 LLM02 LLM07 ASI03 ASI02
seceng.bundle-eval-new-function
Section titled “seceng.bundle-eval-new-function”warning javascript, typescript browser-extension
Built browser artifact uses eval or Function constructor. In AI extensions, model-influenced code paths can become script execution sinks.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).
CWE-94 LLM05 LLM06 ASI05 ASI02
seceng.bundle-chrome-message-handler-privileged-api
Section titled “seceng.bundle-chrome-message-handler-privileged-api”info javascript, typescript browser-extension
Built extension artifact contains runtime message handler and privileged Chrome APIs. Verify sender checks and allowlists in source.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.