# client-trusted-privilege-v1

> client-trusted-privilege-v1: 1 Keryn rule for python, typescript, javascript, php (1 warning).

Source: https://keryn.dev/rules/client-trusted-privilege-v1/

1 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · [all packs](https://keryn.dev/rules/)

**How to read a rule**

- **Severity**: How bad the finding is if it is real: `error` fails a default gate, `warning` and `info` do not.

- **Confidence**: **P0** exploitable as written; **P1** dangerous in context; **P2** a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.

- **False-positive risk**: **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; **high**: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.

- **Edge**: The relationship the finding sits on. **reaches**: content or traffic gets to a thing; **calls**: one thing invokes another; **reads**: one thing reads from another; **writes**: one thing writes to another; **sends**: data leaves for another party; **grants**: authority is given or left unchecked; **depends_on**: something relies on a component it does not verify; **trusts**: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: **user->prompt** (untrusted input reaching a prompt); **model->code** (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); **secret->outside** (a secret leaving the trusted side); **supply-chain** (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).

- **Taxonomy chips**: References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.

## keryn.privilege.client-field-trusted

`warning` python, typescript, javascript, php python, typescript, nodejs, php

A privilege, role, identity or scope field is read from client-controlled input (request body, args, params, or a PHP superglobal). The caller can set its own privileges. Derive authorization from the authenticated session or a server-side lookup, never from a field the client supplies.

Confidence **P2**: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [grants](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#grants) authority is given or left unchecked.

[CWE-639](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-639-authorization-bypass-through-user-controlled-key) [CWE-602](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-602) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Look up the caller's role and privileges server-side from the authenticated principal; ignore any role/is\_admin/privilege/scope value present in the request.

**References:** [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html) · [https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/](https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/)
