# crypto-claim-integrity-v1

> crypto-claim-integrity-v1: 15 Keryn rules for python, typescript, javascript, java, go, php, csharp, kotlin, swift (15 error).

Source: https://keryn.dev/rules/crypto-claim-integrity-v1/

15 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · [all packs](https://keryn.dev/rules/)

**How to read a rule**

- **Severity**: How bad the finding is if it is real: `error` fails a default gate, `warning` and `info` do not.

- **Confidence**: **P0** exploitable as written; **P1** dangerous in context; **P2** a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.

- **False-positive risk**: **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; **high**: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.

- **Edge**: The relationship the finding sits on. **reaches**: content or traffic gets to a thing; **calls**: one thing invokes another; **reads**: one thing reads from another; **writes**: one thing writes to another; **sends**: data leaves for another party; **grants**: authority is given or left unchecked; **depends_on**: something relies on a component it does not verify; **trusts**: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: **user->prompt** (untrusted input reaching a prompt); **model->code** (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); **secret->outside** (a secret leaving the trusted side); **supply-chain** (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).

- **Taxonomy chips**: References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.

## keryn.cryptoclaim.py.jwt-verification-disabled

`error` python python, pyjwt, python-jose

A JWT is decoded with signature verification disabled (options verify\_signature False, verify False, or algorithms including "none"). Anyone can forge claims, including identity and role. Verify the signature with a fixed allow-list of asymmetric or HMAC algorithms and reject "none".

Confidence **P0**: exploitable as written. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [trusts](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#trusts) one party believes another without evidence.

[CWE-347](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-347) [CWE-345](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-345-insufficient-verification-of-data-authenticity) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Call jwt.decode with a key and an explicit algorithms allow-list of the exact algorithm you issue (for example ["RS256"] or ["EdDSA"]); never include "none" and never set verify\_signature or verify to False outside tests.

**References:** [https://pyjwt.readthedocs.io/en/stable/api.html#jwt.decode](https://pyjwt.readthedocs.io/en/stable/api.html#jwt.decode) · [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html)

## keryn.cryptoclaim.py.ecb-mode-for-claims

`error` python python, pycryptodome, cryptography

A cipher is created in ECB mode. ECB encrypts each block independently, so equal plaintext blocks produce equal ciphertext and blocks can be reordered or spliced — fatal for tokens, badges or claim blobs. Use an authenticated mode (AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305).

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [trusts](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#trusts) one party believes another without evidence.

[CWE-327](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-327) [CWE-1240](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-1240) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Replace ECB with an AEAD construction (AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305) that provides confidentiality and integrity, and bind the associated data (purpose, principal, expiry).

**References:** [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html) · [https://cryptography.io/en/latest/hazmat/primitives/symmetric-encryption/](https://cryptography.io/en/latest/hazmat/primitives/symmetric-encryption/)

## keryn.cryptoclaim.ts.jwt-verification-disabled

`error` typescript, javascript typescript, nodejs, jsonwebtoken

A JWT is verified with the "none" algorithm allowed (or only decoded, not verified). Anyone can forge claims. Verify with an explicit algorithms allow-list of the exact algorithm you issue and reject "none".

Confidence **P0**: exploitable as written. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [trusts](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#trusts) one party believes another without evidence.

[CWE-347](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-347) [CWE-345](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-345-insufficient-verification-of-data-authenticity) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Call jwt.verify with a key and options.algorithms set to the exact algorithm you issue (for example ["RS256"]); never include "none".

**References:** [https://github.com/auth0/node-jsonwebtoken#jwtverifytoken-secretorpublickey-options-callback](https://github.com/auth0/node-jsonwebtoken#jwtverifytoken-secretorpublickey-options-callback) · [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html)

## keryn.cryptoclaim.ts.ecb-mode-for-claims

`error` typescript, javascript typescript, nodejs

A cipher is created in ECB mode (createCipheriv/createDecipheriv with an aes-\*-ecb algorithm). ECB encrypts each block independently, so blocks can be reordered or spliced — fatal for tokens or claim blobs. Use an authenticated mode such as aes-256-gcm.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [trusts](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#trusts) one party believes another without evidence.

[CWE-327](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-327) [CWE-1240](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-1240) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Use an AEAD algorithm (aes-256-gcm or chacha20-poly1305) and verify the auth tag on decrypt; bind associated data (purpose, principal, expiry).

**References:** [https://nodejs.org/api/crypto.html#cryptocreatecipherivalgorithm-key-iv-options](https://nodejs.org/api/crypto.html#cryptocreatecipherivalgorithm-key-iv-options) · [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html)

## keryn.cryptoclaim.java.jwt-verification-disabled

`error` java java, java-jwt, jjwt

A JWT is handled with the "none" algorithm (Algorithm.none) or parsed as an unsigned JWT (parseClaimsJwt), so its signature is not verified and claims can be forged. Verify with a fixed algorithm (HMAC/RSA/EC) and reject unsigned tokens.

Confidence **P0**: exploitable as written. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [trusts](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#trusts) one party believes another without evidence.

[CWE-347](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-347) [CWE-345](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-345-insufficient-verification-of-data-authenticity) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Use a concrete Algorithm (Algorithm.HMAC256, RSA256, …) with JWT.require(...).build().verify(token), or jjwt parseSignedClaims with a verification key; never Algorithm.none or parseClaimsJwt.

**References:** [https://github.com/auth0/java-jwt](https://github.com/auth0/java-jwt) · [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html)

## keryn.cryptoclaim.go.jwt-verification-disabled

`error` go go, golang-jwt

A JWT is handled with the unsafe "none" signing method (jwt.SigningMethodNone / jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType), so its signature is not verified. Parse with jwt.WithValidMethods listing only the algorithm you issue and reject "none".

Confidence **P0**: exploitable as written. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [trusts](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#trusts) one party believes another without evidence.

[CWE-347](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-347) [CWE-345](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-345-insufficient-verification-of-data-authenticity) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Call jwt.Parse with jwt.WithValidMethods([]string&#123;"RS256"&#125;) (or your exact algorithm) and a keyfunc that checks token.Method; never use SigningMethodNone / UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType.

**References:** [https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5) · [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html)

## keryn.cryptoclaim.php.jwt-verification-disabled

`error` php php, firebase-php-jwt

A JWT is decoded allowing the "none" algorithm, so its signature is not verified and claims can be forged. Decode with the single algorithm you issue and a real key; never allow "none".

Confidence **P0**: exploitable as written. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [trusts](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#trusts) one party believes another without evidence.

[CWE-347](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-347) [CWE-345](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-345-insufficient-verification-of-data-authenticity) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Pass a Firebase\\JWT\\Key with the exact algorithm you issue (for example new Key($key, 'RS256')) and never 'none'.

**References:** [https://github.com/googleapis/php-jwt](https://github.com/googleapis/php-jwt) · [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html)

## keryn.cryptoclaim.cs.jwt-verification-disabled

`error` csharp csharp, dotnet, microsoft-identitymodel

JWT validation is configured to accept unsigned tokens (RequireSignedTokens = false) or to skip signing-key validation (ValidateIssuerSigningKey = false), so claims can be forged. Keep both true and set ValidAlgorithms to the exact algorithm you issue.

Confidence **P0**: exploitable as written. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [trusts](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#trusts) one party believes another without evidence.

[CWE-347](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-347) [CWE-345](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-345-insufficient-verification-of-data-authenticity) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Leave RequireSignedTokens and ValidateIssuerSigningKey true, set IssuerSigningKey to your key, and set ValidAlgorithms to the single algorithm you issue.

**References:** [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/microsoft.identitymodel.tokens.tokenvalidationparameters](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/microsoft.identitymodel.tokens.tokenvalidationparameters) · [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html)

## keryn.cryptoclaim.java.ecb-mode-for-claims

`error` java java

A Cipher is requested in ECB mode. ECB encrypts each block independently, so blocks can be reordered or spliced — fatal for tokens or claim blobs. Use an authenticated mode (AES/GCM).

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [trusts](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#trusts) one party believes another without evidence.

[CWE-327](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-327) [CWE-1240](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-1240) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Request an AEAD transformation (AES/GCM/NoPadding) and verify the tag on decrypt; bind associated data (purpose, principal, expiry).

**References:** [https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/17/docs/api/java.base/javax/crypto/Cipher.html](https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/17/docs/api/java.base/javax/crypto/Cipher.html) · [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html)

## keryn.cryptoclaim.go.ecb-mode-for-claims

`error` go go

An ECB block mode is constructed (NewECBEncrypter/NewECBDecrypter). ECB encrypts each block independently, so blocks can be reordered or spliced. Use an AEAD construction (crypto/cipher GCM) instead.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [trusts](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#trusts) one party believes another without evidence.

[CWE-327](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-327) [CWE-1240](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-1240) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Use cipher.NewGCM over an AES block and seal/open with a unique nonce; bind associated data.

**References:** [https://pkg.go.dev/crypto/cipher#NewGCM](https://pkg.go.dev/crypto/cipher#NewGCM) · [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html)

## keryn.cryptoclaim.php.ecb-mode-for-claims

`error` php php

openssl\_encrypt is called with an ECB cipher. ECB encrypts each block independently, so blocks can be reordered or spliced — fatal for tokens or claim blobs. Use aes-256-gcm with the tag.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [trusts](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#trusts) one party believes another without evidence.

[CWE-327](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-327) [CWE-1240](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-1240) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Use an AEAD cipher (aes-256-gcm) and capture and verify the authentication tag; bind AAD.

**References:** [https://www.php.net/manual/en/function.openssl-encrypt.php](https://www.php.net/manual/en/function.openssl-encrypt.php) · [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html)

## keryn.cryptoclaim.cs.ecb-mode-for-claims

`error` csharp csharp, dotnet

A symmetric cipher's Mode is set to CipherMode.ECB. ECB encrypts each block independently, so blocks can be reordered or spliced — fatal for tokens or claim blobs. Use AES-GCM (AesGcm).

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [trusts](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#trusts) one party believes another without evidence.

[CWE-327](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-327) [CWE-1240](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-1240) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Use the AesGcm class (or another AEAD) and verify the tag on decrypt; bind associated data.

**References:** [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.security.cryptography.ciphermode](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.security.cryptography.ciphermode) · [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html)

## keryn.cryptoclaim.kotlin.jwt-verification-disabled

`error` kotlin kotlin, android, java-jwt, jjwt

A JWT is handled with the "none" algorithm (Algorithm.none) or parsed as an unsigned JWT (parseClaimsJwt), so its signature is not verified. Verify with a concrete algorithm and reject unsigned tokens.

Confidence **P0**: exploitable as written. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [trusts](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#trusts) one party believes another without evidence.

[CWE-347](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-347) [CWE-345](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-345-insufficient-verification-of-data-authenticity) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Use a concrete Algorithm with verify(), or jjwt parseSignedClaims with a key; never Algorithm.none or parseClaimsJwt.

**References:** [https://github.com/auth0/java-jwt](https://github.com/auth0/java-jwt) · [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html)

## keryn.cryptoclaim.kotlin.ecb-mode-for-claims

`error` kotlin kotlin, android

A Cipher is requested in ECB mode. ECB encrypts each block independently, so blocks can be reordered or spliced — fatal for tokens or claim blobs. Use AES/GCM.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [trusts](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#trusts) one party believes another without evidence.

[CWE-327](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-327) [CWE-1240](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-1240) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Request an AEAD transformation (AES/GCM/NoPadding) and verify the tag on decrypt.

**References:** [https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/security/cryptography](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/security/cryptography) · [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html)

## keryn.cryptoclaim.swift.ecb-mode-for-claims

`error` swift swift, ios, commoncrypto

CommonCrypto is invoked with the ECB option (kCCOptionECBMode). ECB encrypts each block independently, so blocks can be reordered or spliced — fatal for tokens or claim blobs. Use an authenticated construction (AES-GCM via CryptoKit).

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [trusts](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#trusts) one party believes another without evidence.

[CWE-327](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-327) [CWE-1240](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-1240) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Use CryptoKit AES.GCM (or ChaCha20-Poly1305) and verify the tag on open; drop CommonCrypto ECB.

**References:** [https://developer.apple.com/documentation/cryptokit/aes/gcm](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/cryptokit/aes/gcm) · [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html)
