# kotlin-ai-mobile-security-v2

> kotlin-ai-mobile-security-v2: 8 Keryn rules for kotlin, java (7 warning, 1 info).

Source: https://keryn.dev/rules/kotlin-ai-mobile-security-v2/

8 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · [all packs](https://keryn.dev/rules/)

**How to read a rule**

- **Severity**: How bad the finding is if it is real: `error` fails a default gate, `warning` and `info` do not.

- **Confidence**: **P0** exploitable as written; **P1** dangerous in context; **P2** a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.

- **False-positive risk**: **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; **high**: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.

- **Edge**: The relationship the finding sits on. **reaches**: content or traffic gets to a thing; **calls**: one thing invokes another; **reads**: one thing reads from another; **writes**: one thing writes to another; **sends**: data leaves for another party; **grants**: authority is given or left unchecked; **depends_on**: something relies on a component it does not verify; **trusts**: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: **user->prompt** (untrusted input reaching a prompt); **model->code** (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); **secret->outside** (a secret leaving the trusted side); **supply-chain** (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).

- **Taxonomy chips**: References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.

## seceng.kotlin.ai-provider-key-hardcoded

`warning` kotlin, java android

Kotlin/Android app appears to contain hardcoded AI provider API key or token.

Confidence **P2**: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [grants](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#grants) authority is given or left unchecked.

[CWE-798](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-798-use-of-hard-coded-credentials) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure) [LLM03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm03-supply-chain) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

## seceng.kotlin.system-prompt-in-mobile-client

`warning` kotlin, java android

Kotlin/Android client embeds system prompt, developer prompt, tool schema, or hidden instruction state.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **high**: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.

Edge inspected: [reaches](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#reaches) content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the [`user->prompt`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#user-to-prompt) boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).

[CWE-200](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-200-exposure-of-sensitive-information-to-an-unauthorized-actor) [LLM07](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm07-system-prompt-leakage) [ASI01](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi01-agent-goal-hijack) [ASI02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi02-tool-misuse-and-exploitation)

## seceng.kotlin-prompt-or-completion-logged

`warning` kotlin, java android

Kotlin/Android app logs prompt, messages, completion, response, or AI transcript data.

Confidence **P2**: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [sends](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#sends) data leaves for another party.

[CWE-532](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-532-insertion-of-sensitive-information-into-log-file) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure) [ASI06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi06-memory-and-context-poisoning)

## seceng.kotlin-transcript-sharedpreferences-storage

`warning` kotlin, java android

Android app stores chat history, prompt, transcript, or AI memory in SharedPreferences without visible encryption.

Confidence **P2**: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [writes](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#writes) one thing writes to another.

[CWE-312](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-312-cleartext-storage-of-sensitive-information) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure) [LLM07](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm07-system-prompt-leakage) [ASI06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi06-memory-and-context-poisoning)

## seceng.kotlin-sensitive-data-to-llm

`info` kotlin, java android

Android app sends contacts, location, photo, audio, SMS, or transcript data to AI endpoint without visible consent/minimization.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **high**: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.

Edge inspected: [sends](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#sends) data leaves for another party; it crosses the [`secret->outside`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#secret-to-outside) boundary (a secret leaving the trusted side).

[CWE-200](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-200-exposure-of-sensitive-information-to-an-unauthorized-actor) [CWE-359](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-359) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure)

## seceng.kotlin-webview-renders-ai-html

`warning` kotlin, java android

Android WebView loads likely AI-generated HTML/string content without visible sanitization.

Confidence **P2**: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [calls](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#calls) one thing invokes another; it crosses the [`model->code`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#model-to-code) boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).

[CWE-79](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-79-cross-site-scripting) [LLM05](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm05-improper-output-handling) [ASI05](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi05-unexpected-code-execution)

## seceng.kotlin-ai-output-starts-activity-or-intent

`warning` kotlin, java android

AI/model/tool output appears to influence Android Intent URI/action without visible validation.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **high**: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.

Edge inspected: [reaches](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#reaches) content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the [`user->prompt`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#user-to-prompt) boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).

[CWE-601](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-601) [LLM05](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm05-improper-output-handling) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi02-tool-misuse-and-exploitation)

## seceng.kotlin-okhttp-auth-token-to-ai

`warning` kotlin, java android

Android/Kotlin code forwards Authorization token or app credential to AI provider endpoint.

Confidence **P2**: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [grants](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#grants) authority is given or left unchecked.

[CWE-200](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-200-exposure-of-sensitive-information-to-an-unauthorized-actor) [CWE-798](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-798-use-of-hard-coded-credentials) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)
