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    llm-security-hardening

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    8 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · all packs

    How to read a rule
    Severity
    How bad the finding is if it is real: error fails a default gate, warning and info do not.
    Confidence
    P0 exploitable as written; P1 dangerous in context; P2 a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.
    False-positive risk
    low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
    Edge
    The relationship the finding sits on. reaches: content or traffic gets to a thing; calls: one thing invokes another; reads: one thing reads from another; writes: one thing writes to another; sends: data leaves for another party; grants: authority is given or left unchecked; depends_on: something relies on a component it does not verify; trusts: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: user->prompt (untrusted input reaching a prompt); model->code (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); secret->outside (a secret leaving the trusted side); supply-chain (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
    Taxonomy chips
    References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.

    warning python llm-security-hardening

    Model parameters sourced from user input.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.

    Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).

    LLM10 ASI01 ASI08

    error python llm-security-hardening

    Concatenation in system prompt.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: trusts one party believes another without evidence.

    LLM07 ASI01

    warning python, javascript, typescript llm-security-hardening

    Non-TLS embedding endpoint.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    LLM03 ASI06 ASI04

    warning python llm-security-hardening

    The ‘model’ parameter is sourced from user input.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.

    Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).

    LLM10 ASI08

    seceng.llm10.model-routing-manipulation-js

    Section titled “seceng.llm10.model-routing-manipulation-js”

    warning javascript, typescript llm-security-hardening

    The ‘model’ parameter is sourced from user input.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.

    Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).

    LLM10 ASI08

    warning javascript, typescript llm-security-hardening

    Potential system prompt or instructions being stored in insecure browser storage.

    Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: writes one thing writes to another.

    LLM07 ASI01

    seceng.llm02.openai-assistants-shared-thread

    Section titled “seceng.llm02.openai-assistants-shared-thread”

    warning javascript, typescript, python openai

    Hardcoded or constant thread_id detected in OpenAI Assistants API.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.

    Edge inspected: reads one thing reads from another.

    LLM02 LLM07 ASI06

    warning python huggingface

    Hardcoded HuggingFace token detected.

    Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

    Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.

    LLM03 ASI03 ASI04