llm-security-hardening
8 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · all packs
How to read a rule
- Severity
- How bad the finding is if it is real:
errorfails a default gate,warningandinfodo not. - Confidence
- P0 exploitable as written; P1 dangerous in context; P2 a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.
- False-positive risk
- low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
- Edge
- The relationship the finding sits on. reaches: content or traffic gets to a thing; calls: one thing invokes another; reads: one thing reads from another; writes: one thing writes to another; sends: data leaves for another party; grants: authority is given or left unchecked; depends_on: something relies on a component it does not verify; trusts: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: user->prompt (untrusted input reaching a prompt); model->code (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); secret->outside (a secret leaving the trusted side); supply-chain (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
- Taxonomy chips
- References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.
seceng.llm10.model-parameter-injection
Section titled “seceng.llm10.model-parameter-injection”warning python llm-security-hardening
Model parameters sourced from user input.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).
seceng.llm07.persona-tampering
Section titled “seceng.llm07.persona-tampering”error python llm-security-hardening
Concatenation in system prompt.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: trusts one party believes another without evidence.
seceng.llm03.insecure-embedding-endpoint
Section titled “seceng.llm03.insecure-embedding-endpoint”warning python, javascript, typescript llm-security-hardening
Non-TLS embedding endpoint.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.
seceng.llm10.model-routing-manipulation
Section titled “seceng.llm10.model-routing-manipulation”warning python llm-security-hardening
The ‘model’ parameter is sourced from user input.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).
seceng.llm10.model-routing-manipulation-js
Section titled “seceng.llm10.model-routing-manipulation-js”warning javascript, typescript llm-security-hardening
The ‘model’ parameter is sourced from user input.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).
seceng.llm07.insecure-prompt-storage
Section titled “seceng.llm07.insecure-prompt-storage”warning javascript, typescript llm-security-hardening
Potential system prompt or instructions being stored in insecure browser storage.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: writes one thing writes to another.
seceng.llm02.openai-assistants-shared-thread
Section titled “seceng.llm02.openai-assistants-shared-thread”warning javascript, typescript, python openai
Hardcoded or constant thread_id detected in OpenAI Assistants API.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: reads one thing reads from another.
seceng.llm03.huggingface-token-hygiene
Section titled “seceng.llm03.huggingface-token-hygiene”warning python huggingface
Hardcoded HuggingFace token detected.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.