# llm01-vendor-system-prompt-v1

> llm01-vendor-system-prompt-v1: 6 Keryn rules for python, javascript, typescript (6 warning).

Source: https://keryn.dev/rules/llm01-vendor-system-prompt-v1/

6 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · [all packs](https://keryn.dev/rules/)

**How to read a rule**

- **Severity**: How bad the finding is if it is real: `error` fails a default gate, `warning` and `info` do not.

- **Confidence**: **P0** exploitable as written; **P1** dangerous in context; **P2** a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.

- **False-positive risk**: **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; **high**: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.

- **Edge**: The relationship the finding sits on. **reaches**: content or traffic gets to a thing; **calls**: one thing invokes another; **reads**: one thing reads from another; **writes**: one thing writes to another; **sends**: data leaves for another party; **grants**: authority is given or left unchecked; **depends_on**: something relies on a component it does not verify; **trusts**: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: **user->prompt** (untrusted input reaching a prompt); **model->code** (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); **secret->outside** (a secret leaving the trusted side); **supply-chain** (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).

- **Taxonomy chips**: References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.

## keryn.llm01.vendor-cohere-system-prompt-taint-py

`warning` python data-flow rule cohere, flask, fastapi

Request data, CLI arguments or console input reaches the preamble of a Cohere v1 chat call. The preamble replaces Cohere's default system instructions for the whole conversation, so whoever controls it rewrites the assistant's rules; keep the preamble constant and put caller text in message.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [reaches](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#reaches) content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the [`user->prompt`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#user-to-prompt) boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).

[CWE-77](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-77-command-injection) [CWE-1427](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-1427-improper-neutralization-of-input-used-for-llm-prompting) [LLM01](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm01-prompt-injection) [ASI01](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi01-agent-goal-hijack)

**Fix:** Keep the system prompt a server-side constant and send caller text only as a user message. If the caller may choose a persona or language, validate it against a fixed allow-list and map it to a prewritten prompt snippet.

**References:** [https://docs.cohere.com/v1/reference/chat](https://docs.cohere.com/v1/reference/chat) · [https://www.npmjs.com/package/cohere-ai](https://www.npmjs.com/package/cohere-ai)

## keryn.llm01.vendor-cohere-system-prompt-taint-js

`warning` javascript, typescript data-flow rule cohere, express, nextjs

Request data or CLI arguments reach the preamble of a Cohere v1 chat call. The preamble replaces Cohere's default system instructions for the whole conversation, so the caller can rewrite the assistant's rules; keep the preamble constant and send caller text as message.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [reaches](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#reaches) content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the [`user->prompt`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#user-to-prompt) boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).

[CWE-77](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-77-command-injection) [CWE-1427](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-1427-improper-neutralization-of-input-used-for-llm-prompting) [LLM01](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm01-prompt-injection) [ASI01](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi01-agent-goal-hijack)

**Fix:** Keep the system prompt a server-side constant and send caller text only as a user message. If the caller may choose a persona or language, validate it against a fixed allow-list and map it to a prewritten prompt snippet.

**References:** [https://docs.cohere.com/v1/reference/chat](https://docs.cohere.com/v1/reference/chat) · [https://www.npmjs.com/package/cohere-ai](https://www.npmjs.com/package/cohere-ai)

## keryn.llm01.vendor-ollama-system-prompt-taint-py

`warning` python data-flow rule ollama, flask, fastapi

Request data, CLI arguments or console input reaches the system field of an Ollama generate or create call. The system text overrides the model's built-in system prompt, so the caller sets the highest-priority instructions; keep it constant and pass caller text as the prompt.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [reaches](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#reaches) content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the [`user->prompt`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#user-to-prompt) boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).

[CWE-77](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-77-command-injection) [CWE-1427](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-1427-improper-neutralization-of-input-used-for-llm-prompting) [LLM01](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm01-prompt-injection) [ASI01](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi01-agent-goal-hijack)

**Fix:** Keep the system prompt a server-side constant and send caller text only as a user message. If the caller may choose a persona or language, validate it against a fixed allow-list and map it to a prewritten prompt snippet.

**References:** [https://docs.ollama.com/api/generate](https://docs.ollama.com/api/generate) · [https://pypi.org/project/ollama/](https://pypi.org/project/ollama/)

## keryn.llm01.vendor-ollama-system-prompt-taint-js

`warning` javascript, typescript data-flow rule ollama, express, nextjs

Request data or CLI arguments reach the system field of an Ollama generate or create call. The system text overrides the model's built-in system prompt, so the caller sets the highest-priority instructions; keep it constant and pass caller text as the prompt.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [reaches](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#reaches) content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the [`user->prompt`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#user-to-prompt) boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).

[CWE-77](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-77-command-injection) [CWE-1427](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-1427-improper-neutralization-of-input-used-for-llm-prompting) [LLM01](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm01-prompt-injection) [ASI01](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi01-agent-goal-hijack)

**Fix:** Keep the system prompt a server-side constant and send caller text only as a user message. If the caller may choose a persona or language, validate it against a fixed allow-list and map it to a prewritten prompt snippet.

**References:** [https://docs.ollama.com/api/generate](https://docs.ollama.com/api/generate) · [https://pypi.org/project/ollama/](https://pypi.org/project/ollama/)

## keryn.llm01.vendor-openai-assistants-system-prompt-taint-py

`warning` python data-flow rule openai, flask, fastapi

Request data, CLI arguments or console input reaches the instructions of an OpenAI Assistant or Run (assistants.create/update, runs.create, additional\_instructions). Assistant instructions act as the system prompt for every thread that uses it, and a persisted assistant carries a caller's text to other users; keep instructions server-side and send caller text as a thread message.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [reaches](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#reaches) content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the [`user->prompt`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#user-to-prompt) boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).

[CWE-77](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-77-command-injection) [CWE-1427](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-1427-improper-neutralization-of-input-used-for-llm-prompting) [LLM01](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm01-prompt-injection) [ASI01](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi01-agent-goal-hijack)

**Fix:** Keep the system prompt a server-side constant and send caller text only as a user message. If the caller may choose a persona or language, validate it against a fixed allow-list and map it to a prewritten prompt snippet.

**References:** [https://developers.openai.com/api/reference/resources/beta/subresources/assistants/methods/create](https://developers.openai.com/api/reference/resources/beta/subresources/assistants/methods/create) · [https://developers.openai.com/api/reference/resources/beta/subresources/threads/subresources/runs/methods/create](https://developers.openai.com/api/reference/resources/beta/subresources/threads/subresources/runs/methods/create) · [https://www.npmjs.com/package/openai](https://www.npmjs.com/package/openai)

## keryn.llm01.vendor-openai-assistants-system-prompt-taint-js

`warning` javascript, typescript data-flow rule openai, express, nextjs

Request data or CLI arguments reach the instructions of an OpenAI Assistant or Run (assistants.create/update, runs.create, additional\_instructions). Assistant instructions act as the system prompt for every thread that uses it, and a persisted assistant carries a caller's text to other users; keep instructions server-side and send caller text as a thread message.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.

Edge inspected: [reaches](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#reaches) content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the [`user->prompt`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#user-to-prompt) boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).

[CWE-77](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-77-command-injection) [CWE-1427](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-1427-improper-neutralization-of-input-used-for-llm-prompting) [LLM01](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm01-prompt-injection) [ASI01](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi01-agent-goal-hijack)

**Fix:** Keep the system prompt a server-side constant and send caller text only as a user message. If the caller may choose a persona or language, validate it against a fixed allow-list and map it to a prewritten prompt snippet.

**References:** [https://developers.openai.com/api/reference/resources/beta/subresources/assistants/methods/create](https://developers.openai.com/api/reference/resources/beta/subresources/assistants/methods/create) · [https://developers.openai.com/api/reference/resources/beta/subresources/threads/subresources/runs/methods/create](https://developers.openai.com/api/reference/resources/beta/subresources/threads/subresources/runs/methods/create) · [https://www.npmjs.com/package/openai](https://www.npmjs.com/package/openai)
