llm02-sensitive-prompt-trace-logging
5 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · all packs
How to read a rule
- Severity
- How bad the finding is if it is real:
errorfails a default gate,warningandinfodo not. - Confidence
- P0 exploitable as written; P1 dangerous in context; P2 a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.
- False-positive risk
- low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
- Edge
- The relationship the finding sits on. reaches: content or traffic gets to a thing; calls: one thing invokes another; reads: one thing reads from another; writes: one thing writes to another; sends: data leaves for another party; grants: authority is given or left unchecked; depends_on: something relies on a component it does not verify; trusts: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: user->prompt (untrusted input reaching a prompt); model->code (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); secret->outside (a secret leaving the trusted side); supply-chain (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
- Taxonomy chips
- References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.
seceng.llm02.prompt-message-logging
Section titled “seceng.llm02.prompt-message-logging”warning javascript, typescript, python llm02-sensitive-prompt-trace-logging
Prompt, messages, retrieved context, or tool result appears to be logged. Confirm redaction and access controls.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: sends data leaves for another party; it crosses the secret->outside boundary (a secret leaving the trusted side).
Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule
Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as src/chat.js and scan it with keryn scan src --verbose; the finding below appears.
import OpenAI from "openai";
const client = new OpenAI();
export async function reply(messages) { console.log(messages); const out = await client.chat.completions.create({ model: "gpt-4o-mini", messages, }); return out.choices[0].message.content;}Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.llm02.prompt-message-logging at line 6 (warning, proof 1). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.
seceng.llm02.prompt-message-logging-rust
Section titled “seceng.llm02.prompt-message-logging-rust”warning rust llm02-sensitive-prompt-trace-logging
Prompt, messages, retrieved context, or tool result appears to be logged. Confirm redaction and access controls.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: sends data leaves for another party; it crosses the secret->outside boundary (a secret leaving the trusted side).
CWE-200 LLM02 LLM07 ASI06 ASI02
seceng.llm02.authorization-header-logging
Section titled “seceng.llm02.authorization-header-logging”warning javascript, typescript, python llm02-sensitive-prompt-trace-logging
Authorization headers or request headers may be logged. Confirm secrets are redacted.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.
Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule
Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as server/middleware.js and scan it with keryn scan server --verbose; the finding below appears.
const express = require("express");const logger = require("./logger");
const app = express();
app.use((req, res, next) => { logger.info(req.headers); next();});
app.get("/health", (req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }));
module.exports = app;Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.llm02.authorization-header-logging at line 7 (warning, proof 1). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.
seceng.llm02.authorization-header-logging-rust
Section titled “seceng.llm02.authorization-header-logging-rust”warning rust llm02-sensitive-prompt-trace-logging
Authorization headers or request headers may be logged. Confirm secrets are redacted.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: sends data leaves for another party; it crosses the secret->outside boundary (a secret leaving the trusted side).
seceng.llm02-system-prompt-in-client
Section titled “seceng.llm02-system-prompt-in-client”info javascript, typescript, python llm02-sensitive-prompt-trace-logging
System or developer prompt string appears in source. Confirm this is not bundled client-side or exposed through debug output.
Confidence P0: exploitable as written. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).