llm03-supply-chain
5 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · all packs
How to read a rule
- Severity
- How bad the finding is if it is real:
errorfails a default gate,warningandinfodo not. - Confidence
- P0 exploitable as written; P1 dangerous in context; P2 a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.
- False-positive risk
- low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
- Edge
- The relationship the finding sits on. reaches: content or traffic gets to a thing; calls: one thing invokes another; reads: one thing reads from another; writes: one thing writes to another; sends: data leaves for another party; grants: authority is given or left unchecked; depends_on: something relies on a component it does not verify; trusts: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: user->prompt (untrusted input reaching a prompt); model->code (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); secret->outside (a secret leaving the trusted side); supply-chain (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
- Taxonomy chips
- References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.
seceng.llm03.python-pip-install-in-code
Section titled “seceng.llm03.python-pip-install-in-code”warning python llm03-supply-chain
Running ‘pip install’ from within code without version pinning. This is a significant supply chain risk.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: depends_on something relies on a component it does not verify; it crosses the supply-chain boundary (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule
Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as runtime/deps.py and scan it with keryn scan runtime --verbose; the finding below appears.
import importlibimport os
def ensure(module: str, package: str): try: return importlib.import_module(module) except ImportError: os.system("pip install " + package) return importlib.import_module(module)Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.llm03.python-pip-install-in-code at line 9 (warning, proof 1). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.
seceng.llm03.js-ts-npm-install-in-code
Section titled “seceng.llm03.js-ts-npm-install-in-code”error javascript, typescript llm03-supply-chain
Running ‘npm install’ from within code. This is a significant supply chain risk.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.
Edge inspected: depends_on something relies on a component it does not verify; it crosses the supply-chain boundary (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule
Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as scripts/plugins.js and scan it with keryn scan scripts --verbose; the finding below appears.
const { exec } = require("child_process");
function installPlugin(name) { const child = exec("npm install " + name); child.stdout.pipe(process.stdout); child.on("exit", (code) => { if (code !== 0) console.error(`install of ${name} failed`); });}
installPlugin(process.argv[2]);Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.llm03.js-ts-npm-install-in-code at line 4 (error, proof 1). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.
seceng.llm03.dynamic-model-download
Section titled “seceng.llm03.dynamic-model-download”warning python, javascript, typescript huggingface
Dynamic model weight download detected from a URL. Prefer local, verified model files or pinned HuggingFace revisions.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: depends_on something relies on a component it does not verify; it crosses the supply-chain boundary (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
seceng.llm03.insecure-pickle-load
Section titled “seceng.llm03.insecure-pickle-load”warning python pytorch
Use of unsafe loading with torch.load() or joblib.load(). Models saved as pickles can execute arbitrary code during loading. Set ‘weights_only=True’ for PyTorch or use safer formats like Safetensors.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: depends_on something relies on a component it does not verify; it crosses the supply-chain boundary (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
seceng.llm03.prefer-safetensors
Section titled “seceng.llm03.prefer-safetensors”info python llm03-supply-chain
Loading model weights from potentially unsafe formats (.bin, .pt). Prefer using the .safetensors format to mitigate arbitrary code execution risks.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: depends_on something relies on a component it does not verify.