mcp-filesystem-command-risk
3 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · all packs
How to read a rule
- Severity
- How bad the finding is if it is real:
errorfails a default gate,warningandinfodo not. - Confidence
- P0 exploitable as written; P1 dangerous in context; P2 a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.
- False-positive risk
- low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
- Edge
- The relationship the finding sits on. reaches: content or traffic gets to a thing; calls: one thing invokes another; reads: one thing reads from another; writes: one thing writes to another; sends: data leaves for another party; grants: authority is given or left unchecked; depends_on: something relies on a component it does not verify; trusts: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: user->prompt (untrusted input reaching a prompt); model->code (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); secret->outside (a secret leaving the trusted side); supply-chain (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
- Taxonomy chips
- References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.
seceng.mcp.filesystem-read-tool
Section titled “seceng.mcp.filesystem-read-tool”info javascript, typescript, python, rust mcp
MCP-style filesystem read capability found. Confirm allowed root, path canonicalization, authentication, and approval gates.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: depends_on something relies on a component it does not verify; it crosses the supply-chain boundary (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
CWE-22 CWE-200 LLM02 LLM06 ASI03 ASI02
seceng.mcp.command-tool
Section titled “seceng.mcp.command-tool”info javascript, typescript, python, rust mcp
MCP-style command execution capability found. Confirm command allowlist, argument validation, approval, and sandboxing.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: depends_on something relies on a component it does not verify; it crosses the supply-chain boundary (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
CWE-78 LLM05 LLM06 ASI05 ASI02 ASI10
seceng.mcp.http-sse-server
Section titled “seceng.mcp.http-sse-server”info javascript, typescript, python mcp
MCP HTTP/SSE server surface found. Confirm authentication, origin policy, rate limits, and tool authorization.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: depends_on something relies on a component it does not verify; it crosses the supply-chain boundary (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).