mcp-tool-server-v3
15 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · all packs
How to read a rule
- Severity
- How bad the finding is if it is real:
errorfails a default gate,warningandinfodo not. - Confidence
- P0 exploitable as written; P1 dangerous in context; P2 a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.
- False-positive risk
- low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
- Edge
- The relationship the finding sits on. reaches: content or traffic gets to a thing; calls: one thing invokes another; reads: one thing reads from another; writes: one thing writes to another; sends: data leaves for another party; grants: authority is given or left unchecked; depends_on: something relies on a component it does not verify; trusts: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: user->prompt (untrusted input reaching a prompt); model->code (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); secret->outside (a secret leaving the trusted side); supply-chain (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
- Taxonomy chips
- References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.
seceng.mcp.v3.tool-shell-command-from-args
Section titled “seceng.mcp.v3.tool-shell-command-from-args”warning typescript, javascript mcp
MCP tool handler executes shell command from tool arguments without visible allowlist or approval.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).
CWE-78 LLM06 ASI05 ASI01 ASI02
Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule
Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as src/server.mjs and scan it with keryn scan src --verbose; the finding below appears.
import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";import { exec as execCb } from "node:child_process";import { promisify } from "node:util";import { z } from "zod";
const exec = promisify(execCb);const server = new McpServer({ name: "build-helper", version: "0.3.0" });
server.tool( "run_task", { command: z.string().describe("Task to run in the workspace") }, async (args) => { const { stdout, stderr } = await exec(args.command, { cwd: "/workspace" }); return { content: [{ type: "text", text: stdout || stderr }] }; });Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.mcp.v3.tool-shell-command-from-args at line 13 (warning, proof 1). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.
seceng.mcp.v3.tool-file-read-from-args
Section titled “seceng.mcp.v3.tool-file-read-from-args”warning typescript, javascript mcp
MCP tool handler reads file path from tool arguments without visible sandbox or path validation.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: reads one thing reads from another.
CWE-22 CWE-200 LLM02 LLM06 ASI02 ASI10
Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule
Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as src/server.mjs and scan it with keryn scan src --verbose; the finding below appears.
import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";import { z } from "zod";
const server = new McpServer({ name: "notes", version: "1.0.0" });
server.tool( "read_note", { path: z.string() }, async (args) => { const text = await readFile(args.path, "utf8"); return { content: [{ type: "text", text }] }; });Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.mcp.v3.tool-file-read-from-args at line 11 (warning, proof 1). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.
seceng.mcp.v3.tool-file-write-from-args
Section titled “seceng.mcp.v3.tool-file-write-from-args”warning typescript, javascript mcp
MCP tool handler writes file path from tool arguments without visible sandbox, approval, or path validation.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: writes one thing writes to another.
CWE-22 CWE-73 LLM06 ASI02 ASI10
Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule
Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as src/server.mjs and scan it with keryn scan src --verbose; the finding below appears.
import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";import { writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";import { z } from "zod";
const server = new McpServer({ name: "notes", version: "1.0.0" });
server.tool( "save_note", { path: z.string(), body: z.string() }, async (args) => { await writeFile(args.path, args.body); return { content: [{ type: "text", text: "saved" }] }; });Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.mcp.v3.tool-file-write-from-args at line 11 (warning, proof 1). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.
seceng.mcp.v3.tool-url-fetch-from-args
Section titled “seceng.mcp.v3.tool-url-fetch-from-args”warning typescript, javascript mcp
MCP tool handler fetches URL from tool arguments without visible allowlist validation. This can enable SSRF or data exfiltration.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).
Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule
Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as src/server.mjs and scan it with keryn scan src --verbose; the finding below appears.
import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";import { z } from "zod";
const server = new McpServer({ name: "web-reader", version: "0.2.1" });
server.tool( "get_page", { url: z.string().url() }, async (args) => { const res = await fetch(args.url, { headers: { accept: "text/html" } }); const html = await res.text(); return { content: [{ type: "text", text: html.slice(0, 20000) }] }; });Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.mcp.v3.tool-url-fetch-from-args at line 10 (warning, proof 1). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.
seceng.mcp.v3.tool-returns-env
Section titled “seceng.mcp.v3.tool-returns-env”warning typescript, javascript, python mcp
MCP tool returns environment variables or secret-looking values to caller.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).
CWE-200 CWE-798 LLM02 LLM06 ASI03 ASI02
seceng.mcp.v3.tool-returns-secret-py
Section titled “seceng.mcp.v3.tool-returns-secret-py”warning python mcp
MCP tool returns environment variables or secret-looking values to caller.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).
CWE-200 CWE-798 LLM02 LLM06 ASI03 ASI02
seceng.mcp.v3.public-server-bind-no-auth
Section titled “seceng.mcp.v3.public-server-bind-no-auth”warning python mcp
MCP server binds to public interface without visible auth or token verification.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.
CWE-306 LLM06 LLM07 ASI03 ASI02 ASI10
Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule
Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as server.py and scan it with keryn scan server.py --verbose; the finding below appears.
from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
mcp = FastMCP("inventory")
@mcp.tool()def stock_level(sku: str) -> int: """Return the units on hand for a SKU.""" return {"A-100": 14, "B-200": 3}.get(sku, 0)
if __name__ == "__main__": mcp.run(transport="sse", host="0.0.0.0", port=8000)Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.mcp.v3.public-server-bind-no-auth at line 13 (warning, proof 0). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.
seceng.mcp.v3.public-server-bind-no-auth-js
Section titled “seceng.mcp.v3.public-server-bind-no-auth-js”warning javascript, typescript mcp
MCP server binds to public interface without visible auth or token verification.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.
CWE-306 LLM06 LLM07 ASI03 ASI02 ASI10
Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule
Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as src/index.mjs and scan it with keryn scan src --verbose; the finding below appears.
import express from "express";
const app = express();app.use(express.json());
app.post("/mcp", async (req, res) => { res.json({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id: req.body.id, result: {} });});
app.listen(3000, "0.0.0.0", () => { console.log("mcp server listening on 3000");});Checked with Keryn’s browser engine when this page was built: it reports seceng.mcp.v3.public-server-bind-no-auth-js at line 10 (warning, proof 0). The rule’s own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the playground shows what does.
seceng.mcp.v3.tool-schema-additional-properties
Section titled “seceng.mcp.v3.tool-schema-additional-properties”info python, json mcp
MCP tool schema allows arbitrary additional properties or lacks strict argument validation.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another.
seceng.mcp.v3.tool-schema-additional-properties-js
Section titled “seceng.mcp.v3.tool-schema-additional-properties-js”info javascript, typescript mcp
MCP tool schema allows arbitrary additional properties or lacks strict argument validation.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: reads one thing reads from another.
seceng.mcp.v3-browser-tool-no-domain-allowlist
Section titled “seceng.mcp.v3-browser-tool-no-domain-allowlist”warning typescript, javascript, python mcp
MCP/browser tool navigates to URL from tool arguments without visible domain allowlist.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.
seceng.mcp.v3.tool-file-read-from-args-py
Section titled “seceng.mcp.v3.tool-file-read-from-args-py”warning python data-flow rule mcp, fastmcp, python
A Python MCP server tool (FastMCP @<server>.tool) opens a path taken from its arguments without confining it to a base directory or the client roots. The model chooses tool arguments, so a prompt-injected call can read any file the server can (CWE-22).
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: reads one thing reads from another.
CWE-22 CWE-200 LLM02 LLM06 ASI02 ASI10
Fix: Resolve the path against a fixed base directory (or a root from ctx.session.list_roots()) and refuse it unless resolved.is_relative_to(base); never pass the raw argument to open() or Path().
References: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk · https://gofastmcp.com/servers/tools
seceng.mcp.v3.tool-file-write-from-args-py
Section titled “seceng.mcp.v3.tool-file-write-from-args-py”warning python data-flow rule mcp, fastmcp, python
A Python MCP server tool (FastMCP @<server>.tool) writes or deletes a path taken from its arguments without confining it to a base directory or the client roots. A prompt-injected call can overwrite or remove any file the server can (CWE-22, CWE-73).
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: writes one thing writes to another.
CWE-22 CWE-73 LLM06 ASI02 ASI10
Fix: Resolve the path against a fixed base directory (or a root from ctx.session.list_roots()), refuse it unless resolved.is_relative_to(base), and ask for approval before destructive writes.
References: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk · https://gofastmcp.com/servers/tools
seceng.mcp.v3.tool-shell-command-from-args-py
Section titled “seceng.mcp.v3.tool-shell-command-from-args-py”error python data-flow rule mcp, fastmcp, python
A Python MCP server tool (FastMCP @<server>.tool) runs a shell command or code built from its arguments. The model chooses tool arguments, so a prompt-injected call runs commands on the server host (CWE-78).
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).
CWE-78 CWE-94 LLM06 LLM05 ASI05 ASI02
Fix: Map the argument to a fixed command from an allow-list (Literal or Enum parameter), pass an argv list with shell=False, and require approval for anything with side effects.
References: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk · https://gofastmcp.com/servers/tools
seceng.mcp.v3.tool-url-fetch-from-args-py
Section titled “seceng.mcp.v3.tool-url-fetch-from-args-py”warning python data-flow rule mcp, fastmcp, python
A Python MCP server tool (FastMCP @<server>.tool) fetches a URL taken from its arguments without a host allow-list. A prompt-injected call can reach internal services or cloud metadata and exfiltrate data (CWE-918).
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).
Fix: Parse the URL, require https and a host from a fixed allow-list, and refuse private, loopback and link-local addresses after DNS resolution.
References: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk · https://gofastmcp.com/servers/tools