# multichannel-secret-egress-v1

> multichannel-secret-egress-v1: 6 Keryn rules for python, typescript, javascript, go, java, php, csharp (6 error).

Source: https://keryn.dev/rules/multichannel-secret-egress-v1/

6 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · [all packs](https://keryn.dev/rules/)

**How to read a rule**

- **Severity**: How bad the finding is if it is real: `error` fails a default gate, `warning` and `info` do not.

- **Confidence**: **P0** exploitable as written; **P1** dangerous in context; **P2** a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.

- **False-positive risk**: **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; **high**: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.

- **Edge**: The relationship the finding sits on. **reaches**: content or traffic gets to a thing; **calls**: one thing invokes another; **reads**: one thing reads from another; **writes**: one thing writes to another; **sends**: data leaves for another party; **grants**: authority is given or left unchecked; **depends_on**: something relies on a component it does not verify; **trusts**: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: **user->prompt** (untrusted input reaching a prompt); **model->code** (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); **secret->outside** (a secret leaving the trusted side); **supply-chain** (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).

- **Taxonomy chips**: References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.

## keryn.egress.py.secret-to-side-channel

`error` python data-flow rule python, requests, httpx

A secret (environment variable, config field, or credential-named attribute) reaches an outbound request URL/body or a raised exception without passing through a redactor. Filtering the user-facing response does not help if the secret still leaves through a tool call, an outbound request, or an error message. Redact on every channel, or never put the raw secret on one.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [sends](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#sends) data leaves for another party; it crosses the [`secret->outside`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#secret-to-outside) boundary (a secret leaving the trusted side).

[CWE-200](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-200-exposure-of-sensitive-information-to-an-unauthorized-actor) [CWE-201](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-201) [CWE-532](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-532-insertion-of-sensitive-information-into-log-file) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Apply the same redaction to every outbound channel (tool-call arguments, request URLs and bodies, exception and error text), or keep the raw secret out of them entirely; send a credential only in the Authorization header of the service that owns it.

**References:** [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/201.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/201.html) · [https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm022025-sensitive-information-disclosure/](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm022025-sensitive-information-disclosure/)

**Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule**

Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as `app/billing_sync.py` and scan it with `keryn scan app --verbose`; the finding below appears.

```python
import os
import requests

BASE = "https://billing.example.com/v2"

def fetch_invoices(customer_id: str):
    api_token = os.environ["BILLING_API_TOKEN"]
    url = f"{BASE}/customers/{customer_id}/invoices?token={api_token}"
    resp = requests.get(url, timeout=10)
    resp.raise_for_status()
    return resp.json()["items"]

if __name__ == "__main__":
    for inv in fetch_invoices("cus_1042"):
        print(inv["number"], inv["amount_due"])
```

Checked with Keryn's browser engine when this page was built: it reports `keryn.egress.py.secret-to-side-channel` at line 10 (error, proof 2). The rule's own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the [playground](https://keryn.dev/playground/) shows what does.

## keryn.egress.ts.secret-to-side-channel

`error` typescript, javascript data-flow rule typescript, nodejs, axios

A secret (process.env or a credential-named field) reaches an outbound request URL/body or a thrown error without passing through a redactor. Filtering the user-facing response does not help if the secret still leaves through a tool call, an outbound request, or an error message. Redact on every channel, or never put the raw secret on one.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [sends](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#sends) data leaves for another party; it crosses the [`secret->outside`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#secret-to-outside) boundary (a secret leaving the trusted side).

[CWE-200](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-200-exposure-of-sensitive-information-to-an-unauthorized-actor) [CWE-201](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-201) [CWE-532](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-532-insertion-of-sensitive-information-into-log-file) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Apply the same redaction to every outbound channel, or keep the raw secret out of them; send a credential only in the Authorization header of the service that owns it.

**References:** [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/201.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/201.html) · [https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm022025-sensitive-information-disclosure/](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm022025-sensitive-information-disclosure/)

**Try it: a snippet that triggers this rule**

Written for this page, not taken from any project. Save it as `src/notify.js` and scan it with `keryn scan src --verbose`; the finding below appears.

```js
const webhook = "https://hooks.example.com/ops";

export async function reportFailure(job, err) {
  const key = process.env.PAYMENTS_API_KEY;
  const res = await fetch(`${webhook}?job=${encodeURIComponent(job)}&key=${key}`, {
    method: "POST",
    headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
    body: JSON.stringify({ job, message: err.message }),
  });
  if (!res.ok) {
    throw new Error(`webhook returned ${res.status}`);
  }
}
```

Checked with Keryn's browser engine when this page was built: it reports `keryn.egress.ts.secret-to-side-channel` at line 5 (error, proof 2). The rule's own logic is not published, so it cannot run in this tab; the pack list in the [playground](https://keryn.dev/playground/) shows what does.

## keryn.egress.go.secret-to-side-channel

`error` go data-flow rule go

A secret (environment variable or credential-named field) reaches an outbound request URL or a formatted error without a redactor. Filtering the user-facing response does not help if the secret leaves through a request or an error. Redact on every channel, or keep the raw secret off them.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [sends](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#sends) data leaves for another party; it crosses the [`secret->outside`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#secret-to-outside) boundary (a secret leaving the trusted side).

[CWE-200](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-200-exposure-of-sensitive-information-to-an-unauthorized-actor) [CWE-201](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-201) [CWE-532](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-532-insertion-of-sensitive-information-into-log-file) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Redact on every outbound channel, or keep the raw secret out of request URLs/bodies and error text; send a credential only in the Authorization header of the service that owns it.

**References:** [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/201.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/201.html) · [https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm022025-sensitive-information-disclosure/](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm022025-sensitive-information-disclosure/)

## keryn.egress.java.secret-to-side-channel

`error` java data-flow rule java

A secret (environment variable or credential-named field) reaches an outbound request URL or a thrown exception without a redactor. Filtering the user-facing response does not help if the secret leaves through a request or an error. Redact on every channel.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [sends](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#sends) data leaves for another party; it crosses the [`secret->outside`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#secret-to-outside) boundary (a secret leaving the trusted side).

[CWE-200](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-200-exposure-of-sensitive-information-to-an-unauthorized-actor) [CWE-201](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-201) [CWE-532](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-532-insertion-of-sensitive-information-into-log-file) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Redact on every outbound channel, or keep the raw secret out of request URLs and exception text; send a credential only in the Authorization header of the service that owns it.

**References:** [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/201.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/201.html) · [https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm022025-sensitive-information-disclosure/](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm022025-sensitive-information-disclosure/)

## keryn.egress.php.secret-to-side-channel

`error` php data-flow rule php

A secret (getenv or $\_ENV) reaches an outbound request URL or a thrown exception without a redactor. Filtering the user-facing response does not help if the secret leaves through a request or an error. Redact on every channel.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [sends](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#sends) data leaves for another party; it crosses the [`secret->outside`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#secret-to-outside) boundary (a secret leaving the trusted side).

[CWE-200](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-200-exposure-of-sensitive-information-to-an-unauthorized-actor) [CWE-201](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-201) [CWE-532](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-532-insertion-of-sensitive-information-into-log-file) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Redact on every outbound channel, or keep the raw secret out of request URLs and exception text; send a credential only in the Authorization header of the service that owns it.

**References:** [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/201.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/201.html) · [https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm022025-sensitive-information-disclosure/](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm022025-sensitive-information-disclosure/)

## keryn.egress.cs.secret-to-side-channel

`error` csharp data-flow rule csharp, dotnet

A secret (Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable or a credential-named field) reaches an outbound request URL or a thrown exception without a redactor. Filtering the user-facing response does not help if the secret leaves through a request or an error. Redact on every channel.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [sends](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#sends) data leaves for another party; it crosses the [`secret->outside`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#secret-to-outside) boundary (a secret leaving the trusted side).

[CWE-200](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-200-exposure-of-sensitive-information-to-an-unauthorized-actor) [CWE-201](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-201) [CWE-532](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-532-insertion-of-sensitive-information-into-log-file) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse)

**Fix:** Redact on every outbound channel, or keep the raw secret out of request URLs and exception text; send a credential only in the Authorization header of the service that owns it.

**References:** [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/201.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/201.html) · [https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm022025-sensitive-information-disclosure/](https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm022025-sensitive-information-disclosure/)
