netlify-vercel-edge-ai-v2
6 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · all packs
How to read a rule
- Severity
- How bad the finding is if it is real:
errorfails a default gate,warningandinfodo not. - Confidence
- P0 exploitable as written; P1 dangerous in context; P2 a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.
- False-positive risk
- low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
- Edge
- The relationship the finding sits on. reaches: content or traffic gets to a thing; calls: one thing invokes another; reads: one thing reads from another; writes: one thing writes to another; sends: data leaves for another party; grants: authority is given or left unchecked; depends_on: something relies on a component it does not verify; trusts: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: user->prompt (untrusted input reaching a prompt); model->code (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); secret->outside (a secret leaving the trusted side); supply-chain (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
- Taxonomy chips
- References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.
seceng.edge.netlify-function-ai-no-auth
Section titled “seceng.edge.netlify-function-ai-no-auth”warning typescript, javascript vercel-ai-sdk, netlify
Netlify Function performs AI/tool/data action without visible auth check.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.
CWE-306 LLM02 LLM06 LLM10 ASI02 ASI08
seceng.edge.netlify-event-body-direct-to-llm
Section titled “seceng.edge.netlify-event-body-direct-to-llm”warning typescript, javascript vercel-ai-sdk, netlify
Netlify event/request body is passed directly to LLM prompt/messages without validation.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).
seceng.edge.vercel-edge-config-secret-or-prompt
Section titled “seceng.edge.vercel-edge-config-secret-or-prompt”warning typescript, javascript vercel-ai-sdk, netlify
Vercel Edge Config or edge runtime appears to store or return prompt, tool, model, token, or secret state.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).
CWE-200 CWE-798 LLM02 LLM07 ASI03 ASI02
seceng.edge-ai-route-no-rate-limit
Section titled “seceng.edge-ai-route-no-rate-limit”info typescript, javascript vercel-ai-sdk, netlify
Edge AI route/function lacks visible rate limiting around model calls.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.
seceng.edge-secret-in-public-env-prefix
Section titled “seceng.edge-secret-in-public-env-prefix”warning typescript, javascript vercel-ai-sdk, netlify
AI or database secret appears in a public client-exposed environment variable prefix.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.
Edge inspected: sends data leaves for another party.
seceng.edge-tool-url-fetch-from-request
Section titled “seceng.edge-tool-url-fetch-from-request”warning typescript, javascript vercel-ai-sdk, netlify
Edge function fetches request/model/tool supplied URL without visible allowlist validation.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).