# process-execution-boundaries-v1

> process-execution-boundaries-v1: 6 Keryn rules for python, typescript, javascript (6 warning).

Source: https://keryn.dev/rules/process-execution-boundaries-v1/

6 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · [all packs](https://keryn.dev/rules/)

**How to read a rule**

- **Severity**: How bad the finding is if it is real: `error` fails a default gate, `warning` and `info` do not.

- **Confidence**: **P0** exploitable as written; **P1** dangerous in context; **P2** a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.

- **False-positive risk**: **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; **high**: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.

- **Edge**: The relationship the finding sits on. **reaches**: content or traffic gets to a thing; **calls**: one thing invokes another; **reads**: one thing reads from another; **writes**: one thing writes to another; **sends**: data leaves for another party; **grants**: authority is given or left unchecked; **depends_on**: something relies on a component it does not verify; **trusts**: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: **user->prompt** (untrusted input reaching a prompt); **model->code** (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); **secret->outside** (a secret leaving the trusted side); **supply-chain** (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).

- **Taxonomy chips**: References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.

## seceng.process.interpreter-program-python

`warning` python data-flow rule python

Untrusted input is passed as an interpreter program argument. This executes code even with a fixed executable and shell disabled. Use fixed program text and separate data arguments.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [calls](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#calls) one thing invokes another.

[CWE-78](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-78-os-command-injection) [CWE-94](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-94-code-injection) [LLM05](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm05-improper-output-handling)

**Fix:** Keep executable, code-bearing arguments and interpreter startup settings fixed. Pass untrusted input only in documented data positions. A generic schema or shell=False does not make an interpreter program or execution-capable option safe.

**References:** [https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html#security-considerations](https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html#security-considerations) · [https://docs.python.org/3/using/cmdline.html](https://docs.python.org/3/using/cmdline.html) · [https://nodejs.org/api/cli.html#node_optionsoptions](https://nodejs.org/api/cli.html#node_optionsoptions)

## seceng.process.utility-execution-option-python

`warning` python data-flow rule python

Untrusted input reaches an execution-capable tar checkpoint action or SSH ProxyCommand option. Quoting an argv element does not prevent the utility from interpreting that element as a command.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [calls](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#calls) one thing invokes another; it crosses the [`model->code`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#model-to-code) boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).

[CWE-78](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-78-os-command-injection) [CWE-88](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-88) [LLM05](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm05-improper-output-handling)

**Fix:** Keep executable, code-bearing arguments and interpreter startup settings fixed. Pass untrusted input only in documented data positions. A generic schema or shell=False does not make an interpreter program or execution-capable option safe.

**References:** [https://www.gnu.org/software/tar/manual/html_node/checkpoints.html](https://www.gnu.org/software/tar/manual/html_node/checkpoints.html) · [https://man.openbsd.org/ssh_config#ProxyCommand](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh_config#ProxyCommand)

## seceng.process.interpreter-environment-python

`warning` python data-flow rule python

Untrusted input configures Node startup options or Python module search paths for a launched interpreter. This can select attacker-controlled code; keep startup settings fixed and use isolated Python mode when appropriate.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [calls](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#calls) one thing invokes another.

[CWE-15](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-15) [CWE-94](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-94-code-injection) [LLM05](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm05-improper-output-handling)

**Fix:** Keep executable, code-bearing arguments and interpreter startup settings fixed. Pass untrusted input only in documented data positions. A generic schema or shell=False does not make an interpreter program or execution-capable option safe.

**References:** [https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html#security-considerations](https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html#security-considerations) · [https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html](https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html) · [https://docs.python.org/3/using/cmdline.html](https://docs.python.org/3/using/cmdline.html) · [https://nodejs.org/api/cli.html#node_optionsoptions](https://nodejs.org/api/cli.html#node_optionsoptions)

## seceng.process.interpreter-program-js

`warning` typescript, javascript data-flow rule nodejs

Untrusted input is passed as an interpreter program argument. This executes code even with a fixed executable and shell disabled. Use fixed program text and separate data arguments.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [calls](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#calls) one thing invokes another.

[CWE-78](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-78-os-command-injection) [CWE-94](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-94-code-injection) [LLM05](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm05-improper-output-handling)

**Fix:** Keep executable, code-bearing arguments and interpreter startup settings fixed. Pass untrusted input only in documented data positions. A generic schema or shell=False does not make an interpreter program or execution-capable option safe.

**References:** [https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html#security-considerations](https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html#security-considerations) · [https://docs.python.org/3/using/cmdline.html](https://docs.python.org/3/using/cmdline.html) · [https://nodejs.org/api/cli.html#node_optionsoptions](https://nodejs.org/api/cli.html#node_optionsoptions)

## seceng.process.utility-execution-option-js

`warning` typescript, javascript data-flow rule nodejs

Untrusted input reaches an execution-capable tar checkpoint action or SSH ProxyCommand option. Quoting an argv element does not prevent the utility from interpreting that element as a command.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [calls](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#calls) one thing invokes another; it crosses the [`model->code`](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/trust-boundaries/#model-to-code) boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).

[CWE-78](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-78-os-command-injection) [CWE-88](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-88) [LLM05](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm05-improper-output-handling)

**Fix:** Keep executable, code-bearing arguments and interpreter startup settings fixed. Pass untrusted input only in documented data positions. A generic schema or shell=False does not make an interpreter program or execution-capable option safe.

**References:** [https://www.gnu.org/software/tar/manual/html_node/checkpoints.html](https://www.gnu.org/software/tar/manual/html_node/checkpoints.html) · [https://man.openbsd.org/ssh_config#ProxyCommand](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh_config#ProxyCommand)

## seceng.process.interpreter-environment-js

`warning` typescript, javascript data-flow rule nodejs

Untrusted input configures Node startup options or Python module search paths for a launched interpreter. This can select attacker-controlled code; keep startup settings fixed and use isolated Python mode when appropriate.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [calls](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#calls) one thing invokes another.

[CWE-15](https://keryn.dev/rules/?cwe=CWE-15) [CWE-94](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-94-code-injection) [LLM05](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm05-improper-output-handling)

**Fix:** Keep executable, code-bearing arguments and interpreter startup settings fixed. Pass untrusted input only in documented data positions. A generic schema or shell=False does not make an interpreter program or execution-capable option safe.

**References:** [https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html#security-considerations](https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html#security-considerations) · [https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html](https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html) · [https://docs.python.org/3/using/cmdline.html](https://docs.python.org/3/using/cmdline.html) · [https://nodejs.org/api/cli.html#node_optionsoptions](https://nodejs.org/api/cli.html#node_optionsoptions)
