# prompt-redaction-ordering-v2

> prompt-redaction-ordering-v2: 6 Keryn rules for typescript, javascript, python, java, csharp, go, rust (4 warning, 2 info).

Source: https://keryn.dev/rules/prompt-redaction-ordering-v2/

6 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · [all packs](https://keryn.dev/rules/)

**How to read a rule**

- **Severity**: How bad the finding is if it is real: `error` fails a default gate, `warning` and `info` do not.

- **Confidence**: **P0** exploitable as written; **P1** dangerous in context; **P2** a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.

- **False-positive risk**: **low**: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; **high**: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.

- **Edge**: The relationship the finding sits on. **reaches**: content or traffic gets to a thing; **calls**: one thing invokes another; **reads**: one thing reads from another; **writes**: one thing writes to another; **sends**: data leaves for another party; **grants**: authority is given or left unchecked; **depends_on**: something relies on a component it does not verify; **trusts**: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: **user->prompt** (untrusted input reaching a prompt); **model->code** (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); **secret->outside** (a secret leaving the trusted side); **supply-chain** (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).

- **Taxonomy chips**: References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.

## seceng.redaction.prompt-logged-before-redaction-ts

`warning` typescript, javascript prompt-redaction-ordering

Prompt/messages/completion data is logged before visible redaction, masking, classification, or hashing.

Confidence **P2**: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [sends](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#sends) data leaves for another party.

[CWE-532](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-532-insertion-of-sensitive-information-into-log-file) [CWE-200](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-200-exposure-of-sensitive-information-to-an-unauthorized-actor) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure) [LLM07](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm07-system-prompt-leakage) [GOVERN](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/nist-ai-rmf/#govern-govern) [MANAGE](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/nist-ai-rmf/#manage-manage)

## seceng.redaction.prompt-logged-before-redaction-python

`warning` python prompt-redaction-ordering

Prompt/messages/completion data is logged before visible redaction, masking, classification, or hashing.

Confidence **P2**: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [sends](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#sends) data leaves for another party.

[CWE-532](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-532-insertion-of-sensitive-information-into-log-file) [CWE-200](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-200-exposure-of-sensitive-information-to-an-unauthorized-actor) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure) [LLM07](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm07-system-prompt-leakage) [GOVERN](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/nist-ai-rmf/#govern-govern) [MANAGE](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/nist-ai-rmf/#manage-manage)

## seceng.redaction.trace-attributes-raw-ai-context

`info` typescript, javascript, python, java, csharp prompt-redaction-ordering

Tracing span attributes include raw prompt, messages, completion, tool args, or system prompt without visible redaction.

Confidence **P2**: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [reads](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#reads) one thing reads from another.

[CWE-532](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-532-insertion-of-sensitive-information-into-log-file) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure) [LLM07](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm07-system-prompt-leakage) [ASI01](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi01-agent-goal-hijack) [ASI02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi02-tool-misuse-and-exploitation) [GOVERN](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/nist-ai-rmf/#govern-govern) [MANAGE](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/nist-ai-rmf/#manage-manage)

## seceng.redaction-llm-request-body-logged

`warning` typescript, javascript, python, java, csharp, go, rust prompt-redaction-ordering

Full LLM request or response body is logged. Prefer structured redaction and prompt hashes over raw payload logging.

Confidence **P2**: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [sends](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#sends) data leaves for another party.

[CWE-532](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-532-insertion-of-sensitive-information-into-log-file) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure) [LLM07](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm07-system-prompt-leakage) [GOVERN](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/nist-ai-rmf/#govern-govern) [MANAGE](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/nist-ai-rmf/#manage-manage)

## seceng.redaction-tool-arguments-logged

`warning` typescript, javascript, python, java, csharp prompt-redaction-ordering

Tool/function call arguments are logged before visible filtering. Tool args may contain secrets, PII, URLs, file paths, or tenant data.

Confidence **P2**: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk **medium**: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.

Edge inspected: [calls](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#calls) one thing invokes another.

[CWE-532](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-532-insertion-of-sensitive-information-into-log-file) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure) [LLM06](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm06-excessive-agency) [LLM07](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm07-system-prompt-leakage) [ASI03](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi03-identity-and-privilege-abuse) [ASI02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-agentic/#asi02-tool-misuse-and-exploitation) [GOVERN](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/nist-ai-rmf/#govern-govern) [MANAGE](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/nist-ai-rmf/#manage-manage)

## seceng.redaction-langsmith-langfuse-capture-raw-prompts

`info` typescript, javascript, python prompt-redaction-ordering

LangSmith/Langfuse/Helicone or telemetry configuration appears to capture raw prompts/messages/completions without redaction controls.

Confidence **P1**: dangerous in context. False-positive risk **high**: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.

Edge inspected: [sends](https://keryn.dev/docs/edges/edge-kinds/#sends) data leaves for another party.

[CWE-532](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/cwe/#cwe-532-insertion-of-sensitive-information-into-log-file) [LLM02](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm02-sensitive-information-disclosure) [LLM07](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/owasp-llm/#llm07-system-prompt-leakage) [GOVERN](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/nist-ai-rmf/#govern-govern) [MANAGE](https://keryn.dev/taxonomies/nist-ai-rmf/#manage-manage)
