rails-views-erb-v1
1 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · all packs
How to read a rule
- Severity
- How bad the finding is if it is real:
errorfails a default gate,warningandinfodo not. - Confidence
- P0 exploitable as written; P1 dangerous in context; P2 a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.
- False-positive risk
- low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
- Edge
- The relationship the finding sits on. reaches: content or traffic gets to a thing; calls: one thing invokes another; reads: one thing reads from another; writes: one thing writes to another; sends: data leaves for another party; grants: authority is given or left unchecked; depends_on: something relies on a component it does not verify; trusts: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: user->prompt (untrusted input reaching a prompt); model->code (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); secret->outside (a secret leaving the trusted side); supply-chain (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
- Taxonomy chips
- References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.
keryn.rails.views.erb-unescaped-output
Section titled “keryn.rails.views.erb-unescaped-output”warning generic ruby, rails, erb
An ERB template writes a value without HTML escaping (raw, .html_safe or <%== %>). Rails escapes <%= %> output by default; these forms switch that off, so a request value, a record attribute that a visitor can edit, or a helper result carrying markup runs as script in the next visitor’s browser. Remove raw / html_safe, or pass the value through sanitize with an explicit tag list.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).
Fix: Delete raw and html_safe so the value is escaped. If limited markup is required, use sanitize(value, tags: %w[b i em]) with an explicit list. Build HTML with content_tag or tag helpers, which escape their arguments.
References: https://guides.rubyonrails.org/security.html#cross-site-scripting-xss · https://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/ActionView/Helpers/OutputSafetyHelper.html