rails-views-haml-v1
1 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · all packs
How to read a rule
- Severity
- How bad the finding is if it is real:
errorfails a default gate,warningandinfodo not. - Confidence
- P0 exploitable as written; P1 dangerous in context; P2 a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.
- False-positive risk
- low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
- Edge
- The relationship the finding sits on. reaches: content or traffic gets to a thing; calls: one thing invokes another; reads: one thing reads from another; writes: one thing writes to another; sends: data leaves for another party; grants: authority is given or left unchecked; depends_on: something relies on a component it does not verify; trusts: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: user->prompt (untrusted input reaching a prompt); model->code (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); secret->outside (a secret leaving the trusted side); supply-chain (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
- Taxonomy chips
- References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.
keryn.rails.views.haml-unescaped-output
Section titled “keryn.rails.views.haml-unescaped-output”warning generic ruby, rails, haml
A Haml template writes a value without HTML escaping (!=, raw, .html_safe, or an unescaped interpolation). A request value or a visitor-editable attribute printed this way runs as script in the next visitor’s browser. Use the escaping forms (=, #{}) and sanitize with an explicit tag list where markup is needed.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).
Fix: Replace != with = and drop raw / html_safe so Haml escapes the value. Use sanitize(value, tags: %w[b i em]) when limited markup is required.
References: https://guides.rubyonrails.org/security.html#cross-site-scripting-xss · https://haml.info/docs/yardoc/file.REFERENCE.html#unescaping-html