swift-ai-mobile-security-v2
8 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · all packs
How to read a rule
- Severity
- How bad the finding is if it is real:
errorfails a default gate,warningandinfodo not. - Confidence
- P0 exploitable as written; P1 dangerous in context; P2 a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.
- False-positive risk
- low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
- Edge
- The relationship the finding sits on. reaches: content or traffic gets to a thing; calls: one thing invokes another; reads: one thing reads from another; writes: one thing writes to another; sends: data leaves for another party; grants: authority is given or left unchecked; depends_on: something relies on a component it does not verify; trusts: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: user->prompt (untrusted input reaching a prompt); model->code (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); secret->outside (a secret leaving the trusted side); supply-chain (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
- Taxonomy chips
- References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.
seceng.swift.ai-provider-key-hardcoded
Section titled “seceng.swift.ai-provider-key-hardcoded”warning swift ios
Swift/iOS app appears to contain hardcoded AI provider API key or token.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.
Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.
seceng.swift.system-prompt-in-mobile-client
Section titled “seceng.swift.system-prompt-in-mobile-client”warning swift ios
Swift/iOS client embeds system prompt, developer prompt, tool schema, or hidden instruction state.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).
seceng.swift.prompt-or-completion-logged
Section titled “seceng.swift.prompt-or-completion-logged”warning swift ios
Swift/iOS app logs prompt, messages, completion, response, or AI transcript data.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: sends data leaves for another party.
seceng.swift-transcript-userdefaults-storage
Section titled “seceng.swift-transcript-userdefaults-storage”warning swift ios
Swift/iOS app stores chat history, prompt, transcript, or AI memory in UserDefaults. Sensitive AI state should use encrypted storage with minimization.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: writes one thing writes to another.
CWE-312 LLM02 LLM07 ASI01 ASI06
seceng.swift-mobile-sensitive-data-to-llm
Section titled “seceng.swift-mobile-sensitive-data-to-llm”info swift ios
Swift/iOS app sends contacts, location, photo, audio, or transcript data to AI endpoint without visible consent or minimization.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: sends data leaves for another party; it crosses the secret->outside boundary (a secret leaving the trusted side).
seceng.swift-ai-output-opens-url
Section titled “seceng.swift-ai-output-opens-url”warning swift ios
Swift/iOS app opens URL derived from AI/model/tool output without visible allowlist validation.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).
seceng.swift-webview-renders-ai-html
Section titled “seceng.swift-webview-renders-ai-html”warning swift ios
Swift/iOS WebView loads likely AI-generated HTML/string content without visible sanitization.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).
seceng.swift-ai-output-deeplink-or-intent
Section titled “seceng.swift-ai-output-deeplink-or-intent”warning swift ios
Swift/iOS app uses AI/model output to construct deep link or URL scheme action without visible validation.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).