typescript-orm-ai-actions-v2
7 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · all packs
How to read a rule
- Severity
- How bad the finding is if it is real:
errorfails a default gate,warningandinfodo not. - Confidence
- P0 exploitable as written; P1 dangerous in context; P2 a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.
- False-positive risk
- low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
- Edge
- The relationship the finding sits on. reaches: content or traffic gets to a thing; calls: one thing invokes another; reads: one thing reads from another; writes: one thing writes to another; sends: data leaves for another party; grants: authority is given or left unchecked; depends_on: something relies on a component it does not verify; trusts: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: user->prompt (untrusted input reaching a prompt); model->code (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); secret->outside (a secret leaving the trusted side); supply-chain (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
- Taxonomy chips
- References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.
seceng.tsorm.model-output-to-where-filter
Section titled “seceng.tsorm.model-output-to-where-filter”warning typescript, javascript typescript-orm-ai-actions
AI-generated object or tool arguments are used as ORM where filter without visible schema validation. This can create unauthorized data access paths.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).
CWE-20 CWE-639 LLM06 LLM08 LLM05 ASI02 ASI06
seceng.tsorm.model-output-to-sql-raw
Section titled “seceng.tsorm.model-output-to-sql-raw”warning typescript, javascript typescript-orm-ai-actions
AI-generated text or tool arguments flow into raw SQL helper. This can enable model-mediated SQL injection.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).
CWE-89 LLM06 LLM05 ASI01 ASI02
seceng.tsorm-ai-memory-write-without-owner-metadata
Section titled “seceng.tsorm-ai-memory-write-without-owner-metadata”info typescript, javascript typescript-orm-ai-actions
AI memory/chat/document record is inserted without visible user, tenant, organization, or workspace metadata.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.
seceng.tsorm-tool-args-to-owned-resource-action
Section titled “seceng.tsorm-tool-args-to-owned-resource-action”warning typescript, javascript typescript-orm-ai-actions
Tool arguments are used to perform an ORM action on owned resources without visible ownership authorization.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).
CWE-639 LLM06 LLM08 ASI03 ASI02 ASI06
seceng.tsorm-prisma-include-cross-tenant-ai-data
Section titled “seceng.tsorm-prisma-include-cross-tenant-ai-data”info typescript, javascript orm
Prisma include/select returns related AI messages, memory, documents, or tool calls without visible tenant or owner restriction.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).
CWE-200 CWE-639 LLM02 LLM08 ASI03 ASI06 ASI02
seceng.tsorm-ai-generated-orderby-or-select
Section titled “seceng.tsorm-ai-generated-orderby-or-select”warning typescript, javascript typescript-orm-ai-actions
AI-generated object controls ORM select/orderBy/include clauses. This can expose sensitive fields or cause expensive queries.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another.
CWE-20 CWE-200 LLM08 LLM10 LLM05 ASI06 ASI08
seceng.tsorm-tenant-id-from-client-body
Section titled “seceng.tsorm-tenant-id-from-client-body”warning typescript, javascript typescript-orm-ai-actions
Client-supplied tenantId, organizationId, workspaceId, or userId is trusted in ORM query instead of server-side session context.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.