kotlin-ai-mobile-security-v2
8 rules · Keryn Software Licence · rules 0.8.0 · all packs
How to read a rule
- Severity
- How bad the finding is if it is real:
errorfails a default gate,warningandinfodo not. - Confidence
- P0 exploitable as written; P1 dangerous in context; P2 a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code.
- False-positive risk
- low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real; medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit; high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
- Edge
- The relationship the finding sits on. reaches: content or traffic gets to a thing; calls: one thing invokes another; reads: one thing reads from another; writes: one thing writes to another; sends: data leaves for another party; grants: authority is given or left unchecked; depends_on: something relies on a component it does not verify; trusts: one party believes another without evidence. The boundary it crosses, when there is one: user->prompt (untrusted input reaching a prompt); model->code (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page); secret->outside (a secret leaving the trusted side); supply-chain (code, models or prompts pulled in from outside).
- Taxonomy chips
- References for readers who work in OWASP LLM 2025, OWASP Agentic, CWE or NIST AI RMF. They say where a rule belongs, not that a framework is satisfied.
seceng.kotlin.ai-provider-key-hardcoded
Section titled “seceng.kotlin.ai-provider-key-hardcoded”warning kotlin, java android
Kotlin/Android app appears to contain hardcoded AI provider API key or token.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk low: an exact API or flag, so hits are almost always real.
Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.
seceng.kotlin.system-prompt-in-mobile-client
Section titled “seceng.kotlin.system-prompt-in-mobile-client”warning kotlin, java android
Kotlin/Android client embeds system prompt, developer prompt, tool schema, or hidden instruction state.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).
seceng.kotlin-prompt-or-completion-logged
Section titled “seceng.kotlin-prompt-or-completion-logged”warning kotlin, java android
Kotlin/Android app logs prompt, messages, completion, response, or AI transcript data.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: sends data leaves for another party.
seceng.kotlin-transcript-sharedpreferences-storage
Section titled “seceng.kotlin-transcript-sharedpreferences-storage”warning kotlin, java android
Android app stores chat history, prompt, transcript, or AI memory in SharedPreferences without visible encryption.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: writes one thing writes to another.
seceng.kotlin-sensitive-data-to-llm
Section titled “seceng.kotlin-sensitive-data-to-llm”info kotlin, java android
Android app sends contacts, location, photo, audio, SMS, or transcript data to AI endpoint without visible consent/minimization.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: sends data leaves for another party; it crosses the secret->outside boundary (a secret leaving the trusted side).
seceng.kotlin-webview-renders-ai-html
Section titled “seceng.kotlin-webview-renders-ai-html”warning kotlin, java android
Android WebView loads likely AI-generated HTML/string content without visible sanitization.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: calls one thing invokes another; it crosses the model->code boundary (model output reaching code, a shell, a query or a page).
seceng.kotlin-ai-output-starts-activity-or-intent
Section titled “seceng.kotlin-ai-output-starts-activity-or-intent”warning kotlin, java android
AI/model/tool output appears to influence Android Intent URI/action without visible validation.
Confidence P1: dangerous in context. False-positive risk high: it finds a lead to confirm, so expect benign hits.
Edge inspected: reaches content or traffic gets to a thing; it crosses the user->prompt boundary (untrusted input reaching a prompt).
seceng.kotlin-okhttp-auth-token-to-ai
Section titled “seceng.kotlin-okhttp-auth-token-to-ai”warning kotlin, java android
Android/Kotlin code forwards Authorization token or app credential to AI provider endpoint.
Confidence P2: a heuristic or a posture check: confirm by reading the code. False-positive risk medium: the pattern is legitimate in many programs, so check each hit.
Edge inspected: grants authority is given or left unchecked.